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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of the study was to analyze the potential tax collection from the informal 
rental housing market in Zambia, using household level rental housing data collected for the 
Lusaka Urban District by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) as a basis for computation and 
extrapolation to the national level. This data was used to analyze household monthly expenditure 
on housing (rent), the total number of households in rented accommodation, and the tax regime 
applicable on rental income, to estimate the potential tax revenue that could be realized from this 
emerging sector. The estimates indicate that about K9.7 billion revenue could be collected on 
income from rental housing in Lusaka Urban District alone and a total of K83 billion nationally 
per annum. This represents about 0.4 percent of the country’s GDP in 2007. Compliance needs to 
be improved and legislation revised to ensure that the landlords are compelled to remit tax to the 
Zambia Revenue Authority. The current legislation makes enforcement and compliance difficult 
as it places the statutory tax burden on tenants, who are very mobile. It is, therefore, 
recommended that the landlord is made responsible for the payment of taxes due on rental income 
and that any compliance requirements be enforced against the real estate/property that is 
generating the income.  
This study also examines the performance of the presumptive taxation regime in Zambia The 
study uses data from the Zambia Revenue Authority on revenue collection from presumptive 
taxes which were introduced to capture income from the informal sectors. The presumptive taxes 
already introduced in Zambia include: base tax, advance income tax and turnover tax for 
minibuses and taxi operators. To analyze the performance of the presumptive tax regime, the 
study utilizes data on imports made by those not registered for taxes, to estimate how much 
revenue could be generated by imposing a 3 percent turnover tax on the value of their imports at 
importation. The analysis shows that the Zambia Revenue Authority increased revenue collection 
from K5.3 billion in 2004 to K33.5 billion in 2007. This improvement in revenue collection is far 
below the potential, however, which is estimated at over K501 billion on imports of unregistered 
traders alone. To collect this revenue and expand the tax base, the tax authority needs to improve 
the administration of advance income tax on unregistered importers, and raise the advance 
income tax rate to a level where the importer is indifferent between paying the advance tax at the 
border and paying turnover tax inland. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
1.1 Introduction 
The development of any country lies in its ability to mobilize resources to finance 
development programs. This is especially important for developing countries in Africa. 
However, most countries in Africa have faced challenges in generating adequate revenue 
domestically. This has led to heavy reliance on aid and foreign borrowing to finance 
development that has yielded limited prospects for sustainable growth. The over-
dependence on foreign aid has brought about the realization that has led to a shift in the 
development paradigm that now emphasizes the need to identify sustainable internal 
resource mobilization instruments to finance development programmes (Zambia Revenue 
Authority: 2003).  
The major emphasis for reform has included strategies to strengthen tax policy and tax 
administration. There has been increased pressure to expand the tax base by capturing 
activities that are currently not contributing to tax revenue. These efforts are being 
complemented by strategies to improve compliance among those already registered for 
tax purposes. Compliance and enforcement activities need to be strengthened, not only 
for small and medium companies, but also for large companies including mining 
conglomerates and other multinational corporations.  
Measures to improve revenue collection from the informal sector are hindered by a lack 
of statistical information regarding the scope, extent and potential for revenue from this 
sector. The extent to which the informal real estate housing sector can contribute to 
expanding tax revenue is one of the cases in point. (Zambia Revenue Authority: 2003). 
The inefficiency and ineffectiveness of overall tax administration is another critical area 
that requires to be reviewed to curtail revenue leakages and ultimately enhance and 
sustain government revenue generation and collection (Zambia Revenue Authority: 
2003).  
Although there seemed to be limited political support for enforcing tax compliance in the 
informal sector, the Zambia Revenue Authority collects taxes in this sector using two tax 
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instruments: the presumptive tax regime for transport operators and a turnover tax for 
other small and medium enterprises. (Zambia Revenue Authority: 2003).   
It should be emphasized that Zambia pursued an ambitious liberalization cum 
privatization programme, starting in 1991. The key objective of privatization was to 
allow the private sector to be the engine of economic development in Zambia. Thousands 
of housing units that were previously owned by privatized companies were sold to 
employees who were retrenched. These houses are part of the real estate housing sector 
that have been made available to the rental market in Zambia and may be considered for 
rental income taxation. Though privatization was a challenging policy initiative, 
government recorded significant success in this area. However, challenges have been 
recorded in other areas. For instance, liberalization and privatization led to redundancies 
and redeployment of skills that were no longer relevant. Most of the labour off-loaded 
from privatized companies found employment in the informal sector, which is 
challenging to tax (Nanyangwe, Ndovi, Klepp & Olapade: 2004). 
The potential to improve the contribution of the informal sector remains largely 
untapped. If accurate data was captured on the real estate housing sector in Zambia, 
significant revenues could be collected from this sector. Interventions need to be 
implemented by relevant government agencies to spearhead, among other things, 
formalization of the informal sector businesses, thereby making it easier for the Tax 
Authority to enforce tax compliance  (Nanyangwe et al: 2004). 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
The need to have the tax system raise additional tax revenue to match the ever-increasing 
budgetary pressures as well as to assist the nation to move away from perpetual crippling 
fiscal deficits has been one of the greatest challenges to tax management in Zambia. The 
Zambia Revenue Authority’s Unit on Research and Business Development recognizes 
that the revenue yield of the Zambian tax system has been rather low (Zambia Revenue 
Authority: 2003). This has been due to, among other factors: 
•  declining economic performance,  
• a declining formal sector resulting in growth in the informal sector in general,  
  
3 
 
• poor tax enforcement strategies, and  
• weak tax legislation.  
Conversely, the real estate (housing) sector has been growing (Central Statistical Office: 
2004; Central Statistical Office: 2005; Zambia Revenue Authority: 2003), albeit without 
a corresponding increase in tax revenues from this sector. 
The economic performance of Zambia has not been favourable since 1970 when growth 
in real gross domestic product (GDP) began to register an average annual decline of 0.1 
percent through to 1984. The trend in the real growth rate in GDP fell from 19 percent in 
1969 to 1.3 percent in 1984 against a backdrop of a population growth rate of 3 percent 
per annum. Real per capita income declined by 10.4 percent in the same year (Central 
Statistical Office: 2000). 
Addison and Osei (2001), in their research on taxation and fiscal reform in Ghana, 
however, caution that harsh tax enforcement strategies combined with poor service 
delivery contributes to undermining the legitimacy of government strategies and only 
increases non-compliance with tax. This is a valid precautionary measure for this 
research and serves as a good lesson to Zambia. 
The budget report of 2006 indicated that Zambia has a narrow tax base and that there is a 
great need to broaden the tax base. Current statistics indicate that the Zambian budget is 
internally financed by only 50 percent as at 2005, 54 percent in 2006 and 67 percent in 
2008. Although there is an upward trend in internal financing of the budget, the current 
scenario requires that more domestic tax revenue should be collected to reduce continued 
dependence on foreign financing of the budget (Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning: 2006). 
On the other hand, Zambia has experienced the expansion of the informal sector and 
shrinkage in formal sector employment.  Furthermore, trade liberalization has led to a 
reduction in trade taxes (tariffs) and subsequently trade tax revenue (Zambia Revenue 
Authority: 2002). Compulsory measures should, therefore, focus on internal revenue 
sources.  One of such sectors with the greatest potential to contribute to government 
revenue is the informal real estate sector.   
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This sector currently contributes a meagre 3 percent to the total tax revenue envelope.  
However, there is significant potential revenue that can be generated in the sector through 
house rentals and sales.  This revenue is not captured because of the lack of statistics, 
legislation and policy to bring income from the real estate sector into the country’s tax 
net.  The potential for raising revenue in this sector has, to the knowledge of this 
researcher, never been analyzed and estimated (Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning: 2005). 
The Central Statistical Office’s report of 2006 contends that the growth in unemployment 
pushed a large segment of skilled people in society into the informal sector. The report 
also indicates that between 1993 and 1996 the proportion of households working in the 
informal sector rose from 59 percent to 61 percent. The Incomes and Prices Commission 
(1989) estimated that eighty percent of the Zambian labour force was employed in the 
informal sector.   
Conspicuous in the rise of the informal sector has been the rapid expansion in the 
construction industry. The National Income Statistics indicate that the construction 
industry is one of the fastest growing sectors in the economy, with a projected annual 
growth of 15 percent in 2004 (Central Statistical Office: 1997; Central Statistical Office: 
2005). Much of this growth is recorded in the housing sector and commercial 
construction sector (Bank of Zambia: 2006; Ministry of Finance and National Planning: 
2005).  In addition, a lot of emphasis has been placed on developing the residential 
housing sector through targeted fiscal incentives proposed in the 2006 budget. Ironically 
little effort has been made by the Zambian government to turn the sector into a viable 
source of tax revenue.  
This is partly because there is a tendency to associate informal activities only with poor 
women and children selling vegetables on the street, or small-scale marketers in high-
density areas. However, these people represent the very lowest end of the informal sector. 
It can be demonstrated that there is a healthy stock of traders and business people 
engaged in activities that are potentially taxable.  
Among the business people are landlords who own properties from which they receive 
rentals; real estate agents who lease, buy and sell houses, buildings and land on behalf of 
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their clients; and entrepreneurs involved in the import and export trade who supply 
medium to high quality products; manufacturing, mining and trading houses.  Other 
categories of business people whose operations await taxation include importers of 
second hand vehicles from Japan as well as South Africa; commodity brokers engaged in 
buying and selling agricultural products in rural areas for resale in towns and cities;  trade 
brokers involved in buying and selling products for other people in return for a 
commission; suppliers of goods and services to government and parastatal organisations 
and, finally, consultants undertaking research on behalf of the government ministries and 
international organisations such as United States of America International Development 
Agency and the Norwegian Aid Agency (Central Statistical Office: 1997; Central 
Statistical Office: 2005).  
Many of these people earn well in excess of the threshold for paying income taxes but fail 
to make the required contributions for various reasons ranging from limited knowledge 
on the need to pay their tax obligations or outright evasion of tax. This category of 
taxpayers should pay personal income tax or company tax, withholding taxes and/or 
presumptive taxes (Central Statistical Office: 1997).  
Zambia faces challenges in mobilizing domestic financial resources to finance 
development programs in the country. Domestic financial resources are critical inputs 
into the development process and have several proven positive attributes. It is a 
sustainable non-debt source of development finance that is especially important to 
Zambia, which only recently had its foreign debt forgiven under the Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries initiative. In addition, Zambia’s experience with foreign debt and official 
development assistance has not been impressive especially in terms of stimulating 
economic growth, development and in poverty reduction. It is important that Zambia 
continues to strengthen its fiscal management to ensure that it does not slip back into 
unsustainable foreign debt. Fiscal prudence is not sufficient, it should be accompanied by 
strong fiscal policies that can stimulate domestic savings, raise the performance of tax 
and non-tax revenues as well as attract remittances, whilst limiting capital flight out of 
the country (Central Statistical Office: 1997; Central Statistical Office: 2005).   
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Public finances such as tax revenue provide the most sustainable source of revenue to 
finance government operations and the provision of public goods and services that 
support sustainable growth and development. Thus, the prospect for rapid economic 
growth and welfare depends on the ability of the country to put in place a robust and 
buoyant revenue system that is capable of generating sufficient public revenues to finance 
the country’s development programmes. While the Zambian revenue system has made 
important strides in increasing revenue collection through tax policy and administration 
reforms undertaken in 1994 (Ministry of Finance and National Planning: 2005), there is 
need to further improve revenue collection through wealth taxation. At present, tax 
revenue largely comes from taxation of income and very little revenue is collected from 
taxation of wealth, the main tax being levied on real estate.   
This study seeks to explore and estimate the amount of revenue that can be collected 
from the housing real estate sector under the current tax regime, assuming firstly full 
compliance and, secondly, when compliance is only 50 percent. The study also analyzes 
the total tax collected from the informal sector and examines the potential to boost 
collections of taxes from informal sector operators. This involves analyzing the 
performance of turnover tax, presumptive tax for minibuses, and the recently introduced 
advance income tax on imports of unregistered taxpayers. This analysis assists in 
estimating the potential tax that can be mobilized by strengthening compliance and 
enforcement strategies to capture informal income, including incomes in the 
predominately informal rental housing market.  Knowing the potential revenue, compared 
with the revenue forgone, the government, through the Zambia Revenue Authority, will 
be able to enhance its efforts to improve the tax regime and administration for informal 
business, to improve revenue collection and reduce fiscal dependence on foreign grants 
and loans.  
Further justification of the need to understand the revenue potential arises from the fact 
that government is committed not to slip back into unsustainable debt after benefiting 
from the highly indebted poor country debt reduction initiative and identifying new 
revenue sources is critical in this regard. There is a need to have the tax system generate 
more revenue to reduce fiscal dependence on donor financing and to improve fiscal 
sustainability and macroeconomic stability.  
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In recent years, the Tax to Gross Domestic Product ratio, which measures the overall 
productivity of the tax system, has improved substantially from 13 percent to about 19 
percent of Gross Domestic Product since the creation of the semi-autonomous tax 
authority. However, since 2005, performance significantly declined from 18.7  percent in 
1994 to 16.2  percent  in 2006 (Bwalya & Sigande: 2007). This trend needs to be reversed 
to ensure fiscal independence and macroeconomic stability and it augurs well that 
revenue from the informal sector has increased since the advent of market liberalization 
in 1991 (Nanyangwe et al: 2004). 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The study seeks to explore how wealth taxation, such as taxation on real estate, can 
contribute to tax revenue and promote tax equity. Thus the relevance of this study lies in 
providing evidence on how the presumptive tax regime can be extended to capture tax 
revenue from the informal rental housing sector. The estimates of potential and actual 
revenue provide relevant information that would help to design appropriate tax policy 
instruments and enforcement strategies to increase the contribution to tax revenue. The 
results also provide general insights into how to strengthen and administer taxes on 
wealth (real estate tax) and capture the informal sector in the tax net.   
The informal sector in Zambia is currently estimated at 80 percent of the total economy 
and, therefore, can contribute significantly to tax revenue. The study also provides 
insights into issues of efficient and effective management strategies that can be utilized to 
promote voluntary tax compliance among those enterprises operating in the informal 
sector. Further, the study recommends the need for the Zambia Revenue Authority to 
develop and manage effective tax information systems on informal real estate housing 
sector transactions and actors. This is important to capture housing units and rental prices 
in the informal real estate sector (Central Statistical Office: 2004; Central Statistical 
Office: 2006; Chirwa: 2000). 
It would appear that this research is the first of its kind to attempt to estimate the potential 
tax revenue that could be raised from the informal rental housing sector in Zambia. Thus, 
the findings make a contribution to existing literature on this subject, and on taxation of 
the informal sector income in general. 
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1.3  Objectives of the Study 
1.3.1  Overall objective 
The overall objective of this study is to estimate the potential revenue that could be 
collected from the informal sector, including the rental housing sector, and to analyze tax 
administration measures that could enable effective administration of taxes in the 
informal sector in Zambia. This overall objective will be accomplished by addressing the 
following specific objectives:   
1.3.2  Specific objectives 
• To analyze the actual and potential revenues that can be collected from the 
informal sector businesses and particularly from the rental housing sector in 
Zambia;  
• To review the performance of a presumptive tax regime for the informal sector 
and  estimate the potential revenue that can be collected by streamlining the 
administration of presumptive taxes  by reviewing the performance of the recently 
introduced advance income tax for unregistered taxpayers; and 
• To recommend policy and administrative measures that can improve revenue 
collection from the informal sector, particularly the rental housing sector in 
Zambia.  
1.4 Research Design 
This study utilizes housing census data collected by the Central Statistic Office to 
estimate the number of housing units in rural and urban areas in Zambia, and in particular 
in the capital city, Lusaka. Information is also collected on housing units that are owner 
occupied and those that are rented out, and the average rent is computed for three 
residential categories namely:  high density, medium density and low density. Using this 
information, it is possible to compute the average rental price for each residential class 
and the potential revenue that could be collected from rental income in total, assuming 
full compliance with the tax legislation governing the taxation of rental income. Further, 
data was obtained from the Zambia Revenue Authority on actual collections of taxes 
from the informal businesses and the number of registered but non-complaint taxpayers. 
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This data is used to estimate the potential income from the informal sector, and to 
compare it with what is actually collected.   
The findings in the present study are based on secondary data on the informal real estate 
(housing) sector computed from the Central Statistical Office and Zambia Revenue 
Authority annual tax reports.  
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter one introduces the study’s purpose and 
objectives. It also provides insights into the research process and methodological 
considerations. Chapter two discusses the context of the study by examining the revenue 
collection performance and highlights the major successes and challenges for increasing 
revenue collection in Zambia. Chapter three reviews existing literature on the topic of 
study. Then Chapter four discusses the research design and methodology and key data 
sources. Chapter five analyses the empirical results, including the estimation of the 
potential and actual revenue from the informal real estate housing sector in Zambia. 
Chapter six presents the key findings of the study, concludes the study and presents some 
recommendations.      
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CHAPTER TWO 
ZAMBIA’S ECONOMIC AND FISCAL PERFORMANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter highlights Zambia’s economic and fiscal performance trends since 
independence and highlights the difficulty of taxing the informal sector, of which the real 
estate housing sector is part. Taxing the real estate housing sector is by no way an easy 
task because the sector itself is very complicated and it is characterized by low literacy 
levels that may render voluntary compliance difficult. There is also a lack of tax 
education awareness within the sector of the benefits and effects of paying tax on housing 
rentals to government. The informal sector is generally difficult to tax due to lack of 
permanent commercial structures, relatively low levels of income and the fact that 
players in the sector seldom maintain books of account (Nanyangwe et al: 2004). 
2.2 Macro-economic Overview 
At independence in 1964, Zambia was one of the strongest and most prosperous 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa with real per-capita income of just above $1,200, a real 
growth rate of 5.2 percent, external debt of US $155 million dollars and inflation was in 
single digits at (8.2  percent in 1965) (Mwanawina & Mulungushi: 2002). The prospects 
for rapid economic growth depended to a great extent on favourable international copper 
prices as the rest of the sectors of the economy were small, less diversified and 
uncompetitive, and government revenues were largely dependent on copper export 
revenues.  
The prospects for economic growth started to deteriorate after a precipitous decline in 
copper prices in the mid-seventies. Typical of less diversified and inflexible economies, 
government’s failure to restructure its pre-recession consumption and investment patterns 
led to significant deterioration in the country’s fiscal position (high budget deficits) and a 
rapid buildup of external debt, which rose from US$ 250 million in 1970 to US$ 4,639 
million in 1985. (Mwanawina & Mulungushi: 2002). 
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Table 1 - Selected Macroeconomic Indicators (1999—2005) (Bank of Zambia: 2006) 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Population (millions)  10.2 10.3 10.5 10.8 11.1 11.1 11.1 
Real GDP growth rate,  percent  4.9 3.7 4.9 3.3 5.1 5.4 5.0 
GDP per capita, USD  307.1 314.5 346.7 349.6 389 490.8 654.9 
Private Consumption as  percent of 
GDP  
81.4 87.4 87.1 86.8 81.1 63.8 68.7 
FDI as  percent of GDP  5.2 3.8 2.0 8.0 8.0 6.7 6.6 
Inflation rate,  percent  20.6 30.1 18.8 26.7 17.2 17.5 15.9 
Avg. exchange rate:  ZMK to USD  2388 3111 3608 4307 4743 4772 4464 
Terms of Trade ( percent change)  -7.9 -4.3 -1.3 -7.3 4.4 21.4 5.5 
Overall balance US million  -334 -418 -289 -331 -275 -343 70 
Source: (Governor’s Economic Review Report; Bank of Zambia, 2006) 
An increase in money supply mainly to finance government budget deficits increased 
inflationary pressures pushing the rate of inflation to 37.6 percent in 1985. Gross 
domestic investment fell from about 40 percent of GDP in 1974 to 18.6 percent in 1986 
and real economic growth averaged 1.2 percent between 1972 and 1985 while per-capita 
income dropped to US$260 by 1986. Zambia, which at independence was a middle 
income country, slipped into economic malaise and became one of the poorest and most 
heavily indebted countries in the world (Mwanawina & Mulungushi: 2002).   
As the economic crises deepened, the country acceded to World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund inspired economic reforms in an effort to stabilize and restructure the 
economy. These efforts did not provide immediate solutions to the country’s economic 
problems. Economic growth continued to be depressed, with consecutive negative growth 
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rates from 1989 to 1995, averaging negative 1.3 percent1. Similarly, macroeconomic 
fundamentals continued to deteriorate, with inflation reaching its record high of 128.7 
percent in 1989, before starting to gradually fall in response to the structural adjustment 
and stabilization policies implemented after 1991. By 1999, inflation had fallen to  20.6  
percent and the exchange rate, which was artificially overvalued, depreciated to K2,388  
from K66.9 in 1989 (Mwanawina & Mulungushi: 2002). Prospects for real economic 
growth started to improve, with intermittent real positive growth rates throughout the 
nineties. Real economic recovery only started to be experienced later at the turn of the 
century when real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates rose from 3.7  percent in 
2000 to an average of 5.3  percent between 2001 and 2006, with per-capita incomes 
projected to recover to pre-1965 level of about $1,200 by the  year 2010 (Bwalya & 
Sigande: 2007). Again, these impressive growth rates have been bolstered by a recovery 
in copper prices on the international market and by a stable and conducive 
macroeconomic and investment environment. To sustain these positive growth rates, 
government should remain fiscally prudent and consistently implement economic and 
investment policies that promote domestic financial resource mobilization and 
intermediation, and inspire private sector confidence in the economy.  
2.3 Revenue Performance against Targets  
The Zambia Revenue Authority implements a comprehensive revenue administration 
system, which has progressively and consistently delivered tax revenue to support 
government operations. The Authority’s performance, as measured by its ability to meet 
tax revenue targets set by government, has been impressive from its inception. It has 
consistently met its parliamentary tax revenue targets, even under difficult economic and 
administrative conditions.  
Table 2 below shows revenue performance against targets since 2000. Parliament and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (operational) targets are given in columns two and 
three and actual tax revenue in column four. The fifth column shows the variance 
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 Except in 1993 when real GDP grew by 6.3 %.  
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between parliament and International Monetary Fund revenue targets, and the last two 
columns show variances between actual revenue and parliament and International 
Monetary Fund targets respectively.  
  
14 
 
Table 2 - ZRA Revenue performance against targets (2000-2005 K’billions)  
Year Parliament 
Revenue 
Target (a) 
IMF 
Revenue 
target (b) 
ZRA 
Actual 
Revenue 
Outturn (c) 
Variance 
 
IMF vs. 
Parliament 
target 
(a-b) 
Variance 
 
Revenue 
vs. 
Parliament 
target 
(a-c) 
Variance 
 
Revenue 
vs. 
IMF target 
(b-c) 
2006 6627.2* 6348.4 
 
(278.8) 
  
2005       
5,511.5  
    5,582.8            
5,521.8  
(71.3)           10.3  (61) 
2004       
4,536.6  
    4,498.2            
4,554.3  
38.4           17.7  56.1 
2003       
3,522.0  
    3,468.2            
3,549.5  
53.8           27.5  (81.3) 
2002       
2,818.0  
    2,774.7            
2,848.8  
43.3           30.8  (74.1) 
2001       
2,325.4  
    2,288.4            
2,448.6  
37.0         123.2  (160.2) 
2000       
1,600.0  
    1,841.6            
1,739.5  
(241.6)         139.5  (102.1) 
Note:* After dropping VAT measures amounting to K45 billion, and K63 billion on 
account of the suspension of duty on importations of petroleum up until November 2006.  
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Clearly, the International Monetary Fund targets tend to be more stringent than 
parliamentary targets, except in 2001, 2005 and 2006 when parliament targets fell below 
the International Monetary Fund operational targets. The Authority has consistently 
delivered revenue to government in excess of the parliamentary target, but rarely meets 
the International Monetary Fund target. It is important also to note that the amount by 
which revenue out-turn exceeds the Parliamentary target has been falling, from K139.5 
billion in 2000 to K10.3 billion in 2005 (Zambia Revenue Authority, 2003; Bwalya & 
Sigande: 2007). Several factors may have contributed to this outcome; for example, an 
improvement in revenue forecasting would tend to improve revenue target setting and 
thereby reducing revenue forecast errors or variances.  
A fall in revenue performance below target and a recent decrease in tax revenue to GDP 
ratio appear to coincide with declining government funding to the Authority as illustrated 
in Figure 2 below (Zambia Revenue Authority Annual Report: 2007). This is 
compounded by an increase in tax concessions provided for in the budget and the effect 
of this decline in government support to the Zambia Revenue Authority was exacerbated 
by a dismal performance of the domestic Value-Added Tax (VAT) regime in recent 
years. These factors are all inter-linked and suggest that funding of revenue 
administration systems and infrastructure have reached such critical levels that 
efficiencies in tax administration attained after the establishment of the Authority can no 
longer be sustained or leveraged.  While the Authority has recognized and undertaken 
efforts to streamline tax administration, government through the Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning should review and implement a robust and incentive-compatible 
mechanism for financing revenue administration in the country. Such a mechanism 
should be tailored towards reversing the recent declining trend in revenue productivity 
and performance, and contribute to the attainment of the country’s medium term 
objectives as set out in the macro-economic framework and the Fifth National 
Development Plan (Bwalya & Sigande: 2007). 
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2.4 The Structure and Performance of the Zambian Tax System 
Initially, as shown in Figure 1, trade taxes were the major sources of tax revenue for 
government and accounted for 50.6 percent of the total tax revenue in 1994. Income tax 
and sales taxes accounted for 31.4 percent and 18.1 percent respectively.2 Following 
administrative and tax reforms of 1995, and the subsequent introduction of value-added 
tax (VAT) to replace sales taxes, the contribution of VAT to total tax revenue increased 
from 12.8 percent in 1995 to 38.3 percent in 1996, maintaining an average contribution of 
about 36 percent throughout the late 1990s. In 2000, the domestic VAT contribution 
started to decline reaching its record low of 23.3 percent in 2004, but increased 
marginally to 25.3 percent in 2005. This decline resulted, in part, from a proportionate 
reduction in both domestic VAT and excise duty which, respectively, declined from 
about 20  percent and 18  percent in 1995 to 11  percent and 14  percent in 2005 ( Zambia 
Revenue Authority: 2003; Bwalya & Sigande: 2007).  
In terms of trade taxes, trend analyses suggest an initial drop in contribution of trade 
taxes to revenue falling from 52.3 percent in 1995 to 28.1 percent in 1996 and reaching 
its record low of 23 percent in 1998. Thereafter, trade taxes gradually increased, 
averaging about 30 percent of total taxes between 2000 and 2005 (Zambia Revenue 
Authority: 2003; Zambia Revenue Authority: 2007).   
Import VAT contributes over 60 percent of total trade taxes and import duty and trade 
excise account for the rest. Depending on the import and the importer, much of the 
import VAT collected at the border is actually refunded under domestic VAT.  However, 
import VAT plays an important role in the performance of domestic VAT as it tends to 
secure domestic VAT by encouraging importers to file a claim on purchases against their 
vatable supplies. Import duty is expected to continue to decline as tariffs continue to be 
reduced under the various regional trade protocols that Zambia has ratified. 
 
                                               
2
 With the advent of multilateral and regional trade liberalization initiatives the role and importance of trade 
taxes as a source of revenue is expected to diminish. 
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Figure 1:  Revenue Contribution by Tax Type  
Source: (Zambia Revenue Authority: 2007)  
Direct taxes have shown the greatest improvement since 1995, consistently increasing 
from 31.4 percent of total tax revenue in 1995 to 35 percent in 1996 and thereafter 
maintaining a steady increase throughout the period.  By 1995, income tax contributed 
the largest percentage (44.6 percent) to total tax revenue and was forecasted to reach 47 
percent in 2006. This performance suggests that income taxes have been particularly 
more responsive to economic growth compared to commodity taxes (VAT) and efforts to 
sustain this growth trend is recommended to secure government revenue by further 
broadening the tax base.  Current efforts in this direction include the recent introduction 
of several presumptive tax regimes aimed at capturing incomes in the informal sector.  
The major driver of income tax is Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE), accounting for over 65 
percent of total income taxes in 2007, 2008 and 2009. The contribution of PAYE to the 
total tax revenue recorded the highest growth rate since 1995, increasing from 16  percent 
in 1996 to 32.6  percent in 2004, before declining to 31.2  percent in 2005 (Zambia 
Revenue Authority: 2007; Bwalya & Sigande: 2007).  In comparison, company tax only 
grew from 6.2 percent in 1995 to 8.2 percent in 2005, and mineral royalties showed a 
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marked decline in their contribution to tax revenue, steadily declining from 5.2 percent in 
1995 to 2.3 percent and 1 percent in 1996 and 1999 respectively. Between 2000 and 
2004, the average contribution of mineral royalties to tax revenue was only 0.2 percent. It 
only increased marginally to 0.7 percent in 2005, following a rebound in production and 
metal prices on the international market. This decline is also explained by a significant 
reduction in the royalty rate on mineral extraction, which decreased from about 3  percent 
before privatization to a meager 0.6 percent after privatization (Zambia Revenue 
Authority: 2007). The mineral royalty currently provides a cash flow advantage to 
government as it is a deductible expense for income tax purposes of mining companies. It 
enables government to receive some revenue from mining companies even when they are 
not in a profitable situation.    
There is an opportunity to capture additional revenue from the mining sector by scaling 
up efforts to renegotiate for an upward adjustment of the mineral royalty rate and to 
further bring all base metals jointly produced with copper into the tax base and to 
implement a separate royalty regime and license for each base metal jointly produced 
with another. Stream-lining the mineral licensing system and revising the fiscal regime 
for the mining sector to international standards would significantly contribute to base 
broadening and subsequently to government revenue and to social welfare of the 
Zambian people by increasing government capacity to fund the provision of public 
services.  
In summary, this trend analysis of revenue contribution to total tax revenue provides 
useful insights for long term tax planning for Zambia. It reviews an interesting pattern of 
our revenue system that is heavily dependent on income taxes and trade taxes.3 This 
pattern may not be sustainable in the long-term, especially with the ongoing progressive 
reduction in import tariffs inspired by regional and multilateral trade agreements.  Given 
                                               
3
 In most countries, consumption taxes tend to be the major sources of revenue. For instance in 2001, 
consumption taxes contributed 32.6% to tax revenue in the  OECD countries, (but only 16.1% in the USA) 
and most developing countries are much more dependant on consumption taxes. For instance, in Mexico, 
consumption taxes contribute 73.5% to total tax revenue in 2001 (Bwalya & Sigande: 2007).   
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The Share of Tax Revenue in Gross Domestic Product (1995-2006)
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the continuous reduction in trade taxes, the country must escalate its efforts to reverse the 
declining trend in consumption taxes (VAT) and implement measures to step up the 
contribution of VAT to total tax revenue.  This calls for both a tax policy review of the 
VAT regime as well as initiatives aimed at promoting compliance. There is a need to 
broaden its application in terms of the number of commodities on which consumption 
taxes are payable as well as raising compliance and taxpayer education campaigns. 
2.5 Declining Trend in Tax Revenue to GDP 
Figure 2 below shows the trend in tax revenue to GDP. Although the revenue system was 
more productive at the inception of the Authority, with revenues of over 18 percent to 
GDP, the ratio fell from 18.5 percent in 1997 to 17.2 percent in 1996. In subsequent 
years, revenues continued to fluctuate between 17.5 percent and 17% up until 2004. After 
2004, the revenue to GDP ratio started to fall, reaching a projected level of 16.2   percent 
in 2006, but this performance in the last two years is not indicative of the optimal 
performance of the country’s revenue system (Zambia Revenue Authority: 2007).  
Figure 2: The Share of Tax Revenue in the Gross Domestic Product (1995—2005)  
Source: (Zambia Revenue Authority Annual Tax Reports, 2007) 
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It is, however, worrisome to government which needs to scale up its expenditures to 
promote rapid economic growth and reduce the incidence and severity of poverty in the 
country. Sustaining a declining trend in revenue has much wider implications as it fails to 
meet projected revenue that forms the basis for the country’s medium term economic 
development program (Fifth National Development Plan) and the medium term macro-
economic framework targets. It is, therefore, imperative that this trend is reversed to 
levels consistent with the country’s development plan and macro-economic framework. 
But to reverse this revenue trend, detailed analyses of factors underlying the recent 
dismal performance should be documented and should form the basis for tax planning 
and administration.  Interestingly, the below average performance in the last two years 
coincides and is consistent with quite impressive average economic growth rates of 5 
percent. It is, however, unexpected for a responsive tax system to record a revenue 
decline when the economy is actually growing (Bwalya & Sigande: 2007). 
It is, therefore, important to conduct a diagnosis, not comprehensive but indicative of the 
revenue structure in terms of its responsiveness to changes in income (economic growth). 
This analysis is extended to cover the major tax types for which data is readily available.    
2.6 Is the Zambian Tax System Responsive? 
Revenue performance is often analyzed with reference to its base. Economic growth 
tends to be the best proxy for overall revenue base and this base is used to examine the 
responsiveness of the tax system to changes in national income. The expectation is that 
when the revenue system is responsive (buoyant), there is a tendency for revenue to drift 
with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the long term. Figure 3 below plots growth rates 
in GDP and total tax revenue.  The figure shows that the tax system is fairly responsive, 
meaning that the revenue system is capable of capturing more revenue when the economy 
is doing well and similarly records a revenue decline during bad times when the economy 
is in a recession. With the exception of 2001, when revenue growth was significantly 
above the growth rate of the economy mainly on account of the Parastatal Debt Swap 
Initiative, the growth in tax revenue shows a high correlation with economic growth over 
the period (Zambia Revenue Authority: 2003; Zambia Revenue Authority: 2005). The 
observed discrepancies arise from discretionary measures (mostly budgetary measures 
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and tax concessions), which tend to vary from year to year. They may also reflect the 
enforcement effort exerted by the Authority to raise compliance and prevent tax fraud 
and tax evasion.           
Figure 3 - Growth in Nominal GDP and Tax Revenue 1995-2005 Figure (Zambia 
Revenue Authority: 2007)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Zambia Revenue Authority – 2005 Annual Report 
This trend analysis seems to suggest that the tax system is quite responsive to changes in 
aggregate income (GDP). More detailed analysis of the responsiveness of the tax system 
is presented below and statistical econometric procedures are used to estimate the overall 
responsiveness of the tax system (referred to as buoyancy) and further split buoyancy into 
two more specific measures—the effects of discretionary tax measures and the actual 
elasticity of the tax system (in-built flexibility). Firstly, estimates for the overall tax 
system are presented, and then disaggregated by looking at specific tax types. 
Table 3 provides summary estimates of buoyancy, elasticity and discretionary measures 
before and after the establishment of the Zambia Revenue Authority. The idea is to gauge 
how the tax system has changed after the reform and to see how any progress made so far 
can be leveraged for even further improvements. The evidence suggests significant 
improvement in the responsiveness of the tax system, with buoyancy increasing from 
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0.78 before Zambia Revenue Authority reform to 2.91 after reform. The automatic 
responsiveness of the tax system also improved, from what was previously an inelastic 
tax system (elasticity 0.85) to one that is now fairly elastic (1.25). This implies that if 
incomes increase by 1 percent, revenue increases by 1.25 percent. This suggests that the 
tax system is capable of capturing a large percentage of taxes from an increase in income 
(GDP). In addition, revenue collection is affected by efficiencies in tax administration, by 
the effects of discretionary tax measures (tax concessions, holidays, etc.) and other tax 
administrative measures. These measures either increase or erode the tax base and affect 
the responsiveness of the tax system.  
Table 3 - The Responsiveness of the Overall Tax System (1973—2005) 
Overall tax system Pre-ZRA Reform Post ZRA Reform 1973--2005 
Buoyancy 0.78 2.91 1.19 
Elasticity 0.85 1.25 1.62 
Discretionary measures 0.82 0.87 0.84 
Source: (Phiri: 2006) 
The estimated effect on the tax system of these discretionary measures shows great 
improvement in post-Zambia Revenue Authority period compared to the pre-reform 
period. The evidence suggests that the creation of Zambia Revenue Authority has helped 
to improve tax administration and that discretionary measures on the overall have had a 
positive effect (elasticity = 0.87) on revenue performance (Phiri: 2006). However, the 
effect of discretionary measures on tax revenue is lower than expected and there exists 
substantial scope to limit certain discretionary measures that erode the tax base and 
reduce the responsiveness of the tax system to changes in Gross Domestic Product.  
Limiting discretionary (budgetary) measures that erode the tax base has become even 
more important in recent years when the ratio of taxes to Gross Domestic Product has 
been falling (Figure2).  
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2.7 Role of the Informal Sector in the National Economy 
In the context of the severe contraction in formal sector employment during the past 
decade of rigorous economic reform implementation, the informal sector employment has 
increased, growing at approximately 5  percent per annum, and now employs 80 percent 
of over 4.4 million labor force compared to 43 percent of total urban labor in 1985 
(Seshamani: 1999)4. However, the capacity for the informal sector to absorb the ever-
growing labor force and new entrants (mostly the youth) seeking sustainable employment 
is being exhausted and deliberate measures to expand livelihood options need to be 
identified and implemented.  As in many developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
informal sector in Zambia is highly heterogeneous and sometimes over-lapping with the 
formal sector. It embraces the most dynamic and highly productive activities and less 
productive ones. According to Seshamani (1999), the informal sector in Zambia can 
loosely be subdivided into three sectors. The micro-enterprise sector has considerable 
potential for growth and is perhaps the most dynamic aspect of the informal sector in 
Zambia. The micro-enterprises are predominately in manufacturing and high value 
wholesale and retail activities. The enterprises tend to have close, but highly beneficial 
business links with the formal sector. For instance, micro-enterprises in furniture and 
textiles receive contracts to produce and supply their produce to formally incorporated 
enterprises. Those in large maize marketing often supply to milling and brewery 
companies.  It is in this context that these micro-enterprises operating in the informal 
sector are being regarded as the most dynamic aspects of the informal sector and often 
seen as an extension of the formal sector.  
                                               
4
 The informal sector is mainly defined by stating the characteristics of its businesses. Various definitions 
of the informal sector exist. However, the following United Nations International Labour Organization’s 
definition of the informal sector is pertinent to this study; Small units of production, independent self 
employed producers, a predominance of family labour, little capital, low technology, low productivity, 
irregular incomes, etc.  (International Labour Organization: 1994).  
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The second category comprises the household or family sector employing unpaid family 
labour. This category dominates the subsistence agriculture and low-value trading 
(retailing and vending) and restaurants.  These livelihood activities are less diverse and 
with limited capacity for growth.  The third category essentially includes independent 
service sector activities and embraces domestic workers, helpers, street vendors, and 
cleaners. Women and the youth dominate this form of informal sector employment. 
(Central Statistical Office: 2006).  
In the context of the above categorization, the informal sector can be seen to play two 
distinct roles in the national economy, depending on the nature and scope of activities 
people engage in (Seshamani: 1999). On one hand, those who look at the informal sector 
as a transitory and residual economy, contend that the informal sector plays a minimal 
and transitory role in providing sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction options, 
and makes a marginal contribution to national development. The basic premise is that 
people enter into the informal sector on a temporary basis while waiting for opportunities 
in the formal sector to unfold. This is because the informal sector only provides fixed 
income opportunities that people compete for, resulting in an involuntary growth of the 
informal sector. This growth further makes entrepreneurs compete for fixed income 
opportunities, which is eventually exhausted, subsequently engulfing people in poverty. 
Moreover, due to technical and inefficiencies associated with micro-enterprises in the 
informal sector, households and individuals fail to rejuvenate or diversify their income 
generating activities and as such get permanently trapped into poverty (Seshamani: 
1999). 
On the other hand, the opponents of the transitory notion put forward the argument that 
the informal sector plays an important role in people's livelihoods and national 
development in several ways: firstly, the informal sector is critical in human capital 
formation, for instance through apprenticeship and learning by doing, it acts as an 
incubator for entrepreneurship and enterprise development in the economy; secondly, the 
informal sector provides employment and income generation. Despite involuntary 
growth, it provides self-employment, although without social security. Thirdly, where a 
niche is established in the market, the informal sector can provide sustainable 
employment and income to a majority of the people both in the formal and the informal 
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sector. In fact, evidence suggests that in Zambia, informal sector income in some cases is 
higher than formal sector income. Finally, the informal sector plays a cardinal role in the 
distribution chain for most goods and services, especially in the rural areas of Zambia. 
(Simbyakula: 1990). 
2.8 Taxation of the Informal Sector in Zambia 
The informal sector is mainly defined by stating the characteristics of its businesses. 
Various definitions of the informal sector exist. However, the following United Nations 
International Labour Organization’s definition of the sector is pertinent to this study: 
Small units of production, independent self-employed producers, a predominance of 
family labour, little capital, low technology, low productivity and irregular incomes, 
among others (Simbyakula: 1990).  
Other notable characteristics of the informal sector include the ease of entry and the 
freedom from bureaucratic regulation. It is important to note that this definition makes no 
definite mention of income levels earned in the informal sector. It should also be noted 
that the informal sector comprises many other sub-sectors such as the informal real estate 
housing sector, real estate properties, transporters, farmers, cross-border traders, and 
marketers, among others. The informal sector is primarily small scale, uses little capital 
and in Zambia is not fully exploited as a source of tax revenue.  
According to Simbyakula (1990), many people in developing countries are involved in 
subsistence production of goods and services. He questions whether or not such people 
should be subjected to personal income tax. In addition, Simbyakula argues that if the 
aim of an income tax is to help collect as much revenue as possible, it is, therefore, 
prudent that institutions responsible for revenue collection cast a wide tax net. This 
entails that economic activities that earn substantial income within the informal sector 
must be captured in the tax net. Simbyakula states that the requirement to pay tax will 
provide an incentive to the informal sector to enhance productivity. He insists that 
“ability to pay” among the informal sector players would necessitate exempting a lot of 
people from this sector for the reason that they produce only enough to sustain 
themselves.  
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In considering how the informal sector should be taxed, Simbyakula (1990) postulates 
that it is critical to bear in mind fundamental principles based on income tax guidelines as 
suggested as far back as 1951. Among such principles are the existence of a 
predominantly monetized economy, a high level of literacy, the prevalence of reliable 
accounting records to determine income, a large degree of voluntary compliance, an 
appropriate political environment and an honest, efficient and effective tax 
administration.  
Though there is a need to reform tax laws, this does not necessarily result in efficient and 
effective tax collection. There are certain taxation principles that ought to be given 
special attention in an effort to capture tax revenue from the informal sector (Simbyakula: 
1990; Atkinson & Stiglitz: 1976).  Several approaches have been experimented on in 
different countries with respect to cost-effective taxation of the informal sector. For 
instance, Ghana tried to implement taxation through standard assessments, via the 
leadership of the groups and associations in the informal sector (the bus operators’ 
association), and daily income tax rates for specified informal sector groups such as 
commercial taxi drivers (Addison & Osei: 2001; Addison & Levin: 2005). However, the 
large number of operators in the informal sector makes the cost of effectively collecting 
taxes from the sector uneconomical. On the other hand, the number of participants in and 
the size of the informal sector makes it an attractive sector for revenue collection and if 
not targeted would compromise tax compliance among medium and large income 
taxpayers who would seek to hide their operations in the informal sector to evade taxes.  
From the foregoing, there is little doubt that Zambia’s economic performance has 
recorded little significant growth in the last few years. This assertion is corroborated by 
data from the Central Statistics Office (Central Statistical Office: 2006). Such 
performance may, however, be further enhanced by subjecting business people in the real 
estate sector to taxation. Lessons drawn from Ghana show that it is feasible to do so even 
when taxing the sector suffers from such drawbacks as poor record keeping arising from 
illiteracy, the high cost of taxing the sector in question and the lack of political will. To 
overcome these problems requires espousing unorthodox, versatile and diligently 
designed tax collection methods, to collect as much tax revenue as possible from the 
informal sector in general and the informal real estate housing sector in particular. 
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Moreover, it may be necessary to carry out reforms in the tax laws and/or policies and 
solicit support from the government to tax the sector. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the body of existing literature pertinent to this study, on Zambia’s 
need to broaden its tax base. It discusses contemporary research and debates relevant to 
this study. The chapter conceptualizes the research topic in the light of ongoing debates 
on taxation in Africa, identifies research gaps, strategically positions the study within the 
research conversation and seeks to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on 
enhancing tax revenue collection. Due to limited scholarly work on the subject matter in 
Zambia, the study draws on literature from similar studies undertaken in other third world 
countries.  
3.2 Examples from other Developing Countries 
Addison and Osei (2001) argue that a number of developing countries have now 
successfully stabilized their economies and are proceeding towards the adoption of 
sustainable pro-poor-growth-oriented strategies. Addison and Osei (2001) in their study 
on taxation and fiscal reforms in Ghana argue that the provision of public services in 
many countries is constrained by low levels of public revenues, which could, in principle, 
be addressed by higher levels of taxation. In addition, Addison and Levin (2005) 
postulate that taxes should be increased when they are so low that the government is 
unable to finance essential public spending.  In many poor developing countries, a low 
tax revenue/GDP ratio prevents these countries from undertaking ambitious expenditure 
programs in health and education (Addison & Levin: 2005). 
Addison (2001) and Karingi and Wanjala (2005) contend that a rapid increase in 
domestic revenue and a corresponding increase in public services should be a policy 
priority. However, one needs to be cautious about increased public spending and 
increased taxation as taxes begin to reduce growth when pushed beyond certain levels 
(Bashir & Darrt: 1994; Berry & Kaserman: 1993). This implies that very high taxes may 
eat into the revenue of taxpayers, which in turn would hinder the growth of businesses 
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and rob them of the capacity to make more taxable income. Addison and Levin (2001) 
also assert that increased taxation may have adverse supply side effects by constraining 
already low private investment. This is a more fundamental problem in most African 
countries. In addition, taxes also affect the microeconomic channels of uncertainty where 
risk aversion and irreversibility of investment projects may affect growth. Low-income 
countries often face unusually high resource volatility, both in the domestic revenue 
component and in the net aid inflow, which indicates that it is important to embark on 
serious diversification of the tax revenue structure (Addison & Osei: 2001).  
Significantly, Addison and Osei (2001) reveal that most developing countries are still 
predominantly rural and income bases are notoriously difficult to tax. The difficulty in 
taxing economic activities in rural areas arises from institutional limitations. As Addison 
and Osei (2001) show, developing countries tend to have archaic tax administrations 
which make the assessment of tax liabilities problematic. This is compounded by the 
tendency of the underpaid tax administrators to be corrupt and the tendency of taxpayers 
to evade taxes, resulting in sub-optimal revenue collection (Addison & Levin: 2005; 
Graetz, Reinganum & Wilde: 1986).  There are also political economic aspects involved, 
where those who should be taxed are exempted from taxation because of the political 
protection they enjoy from institutions and powerful politicians (Addison & Osei: 2001). 
Addison and Osei (2001) also contend that some local government taxes are rather 
unpleasant and impact heavily on poorer households. The problem is not only that those 
taxes reduce incomes of poor household, they also impact on how these taxes are 
collected. Harsh tax enforcement strategies combined with poor service delivery 
undermine the legitimacy of the local government and tend to increase tax resistance 
(Fjeldstad: 2001; Addison & Levin: 2005).  Even if there are improvements in the 
enforcement mechanism, it is unlikely to compensate for bad tax design. Attempts to 
squeeze additional revenues from poorly designed taxes may only exacerbate the 
negative effects on the economy and society in general.  
As Meade (2001) indicates, the introduction of value-added tax (VAT) in a number of 
developing countries has been successful with regard to revenue generation. However, it 
is important to complement VAT with either exemptions and/or excise duties to make it 
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less regressive (Addison & Levin: 2005). Meade (2001) rightly argues that if a country 
decides to exempt a number of goods, a careful analysis would be required as there is no 
guarantee that the tax exemption will be targeted to benefit the poor, as is the case in 
Zambia where multi-national mining corporations are given tax holidays which do not 
benefit the majority of the poor people in the country.  
Literature on taxation reveals that excise duties have received less attention in the reform 
agenda compared to other tax instruments. Yet excise duties may raise substantial 
revenue and at the same time be distributionally friendly (Muriithi & Moyi: 2003). 
However, one needs to have realistic rates to enhance tax compliance and a corruption-
free tax system. These rates should be seen as a long-term opportunity of raising revenue 
as the economy develops and consumers switch from basic commodities to luxurious 
commodities.  
Meade (2001) also argues that broadening the VAT base should be a low priority and if 
implemented, it should only be in those countries where the net fiscal incidence is 
favourable to the poor. Prior actions, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries, need 
to be concerned about the wide divergence between the effective and statutory tax rates. 
Equally vital is the need to raise tax revenue without increasing tax rates, through 
reinforcing tax and customs enforcement strategies such as those targeting smugglers of 
cigarettes, and other high value goods, reducing tax exemptions and fighting fraud and 
corruption. Meade, however, contends that the fight against corruption takes time, as it 
has to be undertaken on several fronts, including tax evasion by some compromised 
officers within the tax authorities themselves.   
Addison and Osei (2001) further state that increased efforts are needed to improve 
revenue collection of direct taxes. As these authors show in the case of Ghana, moving 
away from indirect taxation towards direct taxation can be a distributionally friendly 
strategy.  Shende (2002) also places emphasis on building the institutional capacity to 
reduce tax evasion. He stresses that in order to protect the poorer households, it is 
important to set the income tax threshold fairly high (Shende: 2002; Schill: 1994). In 
Kenya there has been a deliberate policy towards protecting the poor via personal income 
  
31 
 
taxation as the Personal Income Tax threshold was consistently raised compared to the 
per capita income (Addison & Levin: 2005).  
Meade (2001) postulates that if the informal sector is very large and increasing over time, 
tax policy must attempt to bring the informal sector into the tax base and/or attempt to 
contain its growth. Possible policy measures will depend on the cause of changes in the 
relative size of the informal economy. He argues that in some countries it might be 
necessary to develop specific regulations on how to tax the informal sector. However, 
this would probably jeopardize poverty reduction objectives, which most developing 
countries have embarked on.   
Addison and Levin (2005) contend that governments should first provide a governance 
framework within which revenue authorities can perform effectively without continual 
compromise. According to these scholars, governments must not only respect the 
independence of the revenue authority, but also address the need to maintain incentives 
for staff within such service. They should also recognize that weaknesses in budgetary 
and expenditure management systems would undermine the potential economic and 
political returns on investment in the revenue services.   
Equally significant is the need to address institutional biases towards organizational 
overall performance, such as information technology related procedures (e.g. data 
integrity and security) and manpower capacity building across tax type as well as 
sufficient attention to fiscal accountability. The integrity of the institution as well as its 
corporate image should be enhanced through anti-corruption crusades and awareness 
(Addison & Levin: 2005) 
As observed by a Central Statistical Office survey (2006), entry into the formal sector 
labour market has become very competitive. Consequently, most of the unemployed 
people have found their own ways of working and sustaining their livelihood as their only 
alternative to evading the poverty trap; hence the development of the informal sector 
(Eggenberger-Argote: 2005).  
The informal sector should therefore be viewed as an added ingredient to the overall 
national development process (Tendler: 2002; Nanyangwe et al: 2004).  It is no longer 
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just a labour market phenomenon resulting from an excess supply of labour, but a viable 
alternative to formal sector employment.  Most of the informal activities are taking place 
in the trade and agricultural sectors of the economy (Central Statistical Office: 1997). 
Capturing this growing sector into the tax net would help broaden the tax base. It would 
be detrimental to disregard this sector for tax purposes (Gërxhani: 2004). Tax revenues 
will continuously face mounting pressure as the formal sector contracts while the 
growing informal sector has hardly been taxed in the last few years. It is for these reasons 
that the Zambia Revenue Authority has over the last three years put a lot of effort into 
bringing the informal sector into the tax net. Even though the results have not been 
phenomenal the drive continues and new lessons are being learnt at each turn.  
Thomas (1992) argues that despite the diversified set of definitions of informal 
economies, there is general consensus on the main divisions of economic activity, which 
occur within its borders. He states that the irregular sector economic activities do not only 
involve some degree of illegality in the production or distribution or exchange of 
products, but also of the products themselves. Some irregular activities include tax 
evasion, social security fraud, and avoidance of regulations of business. Though this 
activity occurs in developing and transition countries, institutions and governments of the 
First World predominantly measure informal economies, reprimand violators, and collect 
lost income from taxes or fees from business people in the sector who fail to obey 
regulations (Thomas: 1992).   
Thomas (1992) also points out that the informal sector may be spoken of as an amalgam 
of various sectors, all of which are unregulated or excluded from the formal sector. 
Generally speaking, the informal sector involves the activities of mostly self-employed or 
micro-scale businesses working in the production of goods, as well as those involved in 
the exchange of these goods. Selling on the streets of a wide range of goods or services 
often by women is a conspicuous example of the informal sector.  
In addition, Portes (1989) argues that the distinction between the formal and informal 
sectors, though blurred, lies not so much in the product but in the production and 
exchange of the product. He also argues that the International Labour Organization 
adopted the first institutional definition of informal economy, stemming from Hart's 
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research, in 1973, which was organized around the concept of poverty and unemployment 
conditions.   
In addition, Eggenberger-Argote (2005) states that the informal sector consists of 
entrepreneurs who produce legitimate products without proper permits and legal status 
because they lack the resources and/or the incentives to comply with the excessive rules 
and regulations necessary to become part of the formal economy. In other words, 
informal sector activities are extra-legal in the regulatory, but not in the criminal sense. 
Hence the informal sector is a very heterogeneous and complex phenomenon. It includes 
not only the urban poor who depend on informal subsistence activities for their 
livelihood, but also high income people entering the informal economy as a way of 
supplementing declining formal sector incomes or increasing profit margins. 
Understanding the complexity and heterogeneity of the informal sector has significant 
implications for any strategy and policy interventions trying to alleviate poverty in this 
sector and to formalize the informal economy. 
3.3 Presumptive Taxes 
As the International Monetary Fund suggests, presumptive taxes may offer a solution to 
taxing the informal sector. Presumptive taxation has been used successfully in many 
countries to raise revenue from hard-to-tax groups and reduce tax evasion.  Presumptive 
taxation is useful when a country has a weak tax administrative system and offers 
possible equity and efficiency gains (McCarten: 2004).  It is usually used as a proxy for 
income taxation on small businesses and sometimes farmers outside the regular tax 
framework.  
As McCarten (2004) observes, presumptive taxation offers the possibility of reducing tax 
evasion at low cost and broadening the tax base.  Even though revenue per taxpayer may 
be low, there are potentially large spillover effects. Presumptive taxation may be the only 
means to tax small businesses in developing countries. Small businesses are likely to 
comprise the vast bulk of corporate taxpayers, and may prove effective at cutting audit 
time and cost, especially where accounting literacy is low (Slemrod & Yitzhaki: 1994).  
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As a first step, the tax collection authorities must conduct a census of taxpayers recording 
the sales volume for each business.  The second step is to determine the profit margin for 
each type of business based on factors such as location and floor space.  Professional 
income in European Union countries is occasionally taxed on the basis of location 
(Fjeldstad & Rakner: 2003) and in this connection market traders could be taxed based on 
the average income traders presumably earn.   
Introducing a system of presumptive taxation may not be without problems. Firstly, it 
may give profitable firms an incentive not to keep records so that they can be eligible to 
be taxed at an average level (Fjeldstad & Rakner: 2003). Secondly presumptive taxation 
may in practice turn into a tax on the proxy factor used to measure income e.g. on floor 
space or number of seats in a restaurant. Moreover, as presumptive taxation is usually set 
at a deliberately punitive level in order to force firms into self-assessment, it might 
backfire and push firms underground rather than into the formal sector. In addition, 
presumptive taxation allows tax collection authorities a large amount of discretion in 
estimating tax assessments.  This may lead to collusion with tax authorities by individuals 
seeking a lower assessment.  Unless the process is transparent (backed by adequate 
access to court and perceived to be fair), there may be problems of implied harassment, 
extortion and arbitrary assessments. In this regard, taxpayer education becomes crucially 
significant.  
If the underlying assumptions behind the structure of presumptive taxation are not 
updated regularly, there may be unintended burdens. For example, when profits fall 
during an economic downturn, the burden of presumptive taxation may increase unless 
such macro-developments are reflected in the determination of presumptive taxes 
(Fjeldstad & Rakner: 2003). Presumptive taxes can be efficient. As a flat tax, 
presumptive taxes impose no burden on marginal increments in income or profit; the 
marginal tax rate is zero.  However, they may impose a barrier to the entry of new firms 
who will have to start paying taxes based on average incomes of already established firms 
(Fjeldstad & Rakner: 2003).  
Presumptive taxation, as any tax system, cannot yield dividends unless effective 
prosecution and fines back it for non-payers. There is thus an imperative need for easy 
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access to the court for those disputing decisions of the revenue collection authority. The 
Zambian Revenue Appeals Tribunal might end up being over-stretched by tax appeals 
from dissatisfied taxpayers.  
An additional tax that might be ideal for generating revenue from the informal sector is 
the base tax. This is a tax levied on small-scale businesses unable to maintain business 
records. In Zambia, the base tax for 1998 was fixed at 266 penalty units or an equivalent 
of K47, 880 per year (Zambia Revenue Authority: 2002).   
Imposing presumptive and base taxes on the informal sector can by itself not enhance the 
collection of tax revenue from the sector unless the would-be taxpayers comply with the 
law. Scholz and Piney (1995) note that to achieve this goal requires staging an effective 
education campaign aimed at raising tax awareness among taxpayers. They argue that 
this is all the more essential in the informal sector where literacy levels are too low. Some 
scholars have observed that illiteracy is a major source of non-compliance among 
taxpayers (Nanyangwe et al: 2004; Scholz & Piney: 1995).  
It is worth noting here that the general levels of illiteracy are not as bad as the levels of 
‘tax illiteracy’ as even people who are quite fairly well educated seem to know very little 
about their tax obligations. Therefore, taxpayer education needs to be included in the 
national educational curriculum in order to provide an early exposure to tax issues.  
It should be underscored that rental income is an income just like any other form of 
taxable income. However, it is not subject to tax in Zambia, as in other sub-Saharan 
African countries where governments collect property tax (Franzsen: 2002), Simbyakula 
(1990) argues that property tax is an appropriate indicator of the ability to pay in that 
wealth is usually found to be more unequally distributed than income.  
That there is need to subject rental income to taxation cannot be disputed. Property is a 
manifestation of wealth and therefore a source of income. Its taxation is justified on the 
grounds that property owners have the ability to pay tax and it may enhance the re-
allocation of resources. Moreover, property may be acquired with funds that may not 
have been taxed (Landes: 1999).  
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Property tax is a fiscal tool that may be utilized to adhere to certain focal points such as 
land reform, either in rural or urban areas.  Thus, depending on the design and extent of 
application, property tax can exert a greater influence on the way in which land is used or 
the types of structures built and the locality, than income or consumption taxes having an 
equal yield in revenue (Hunt: 2004).  
When properly administered, property tax can be a very valuable source of tax revenue 
for government either at the central level or local level (Frank & Bahiigwa: 2003). The 
revenue generated from this source may be used to finance local authorities’ 
developmental programmes. If revenues from this source are reasonable, the burden of 
income taxes can also be reduced by keeping income tax rates low, thereby having the 
effect of redistributing wealth.  
Despite the fact that property tax offers an opportunity to collect more revenue for the 
local government on sites and improvements in Southern and Eastern Africa, not much 
revenue is collected due to a lack of properly qualified and skilled valuers (Fanzsen: 
2002). It is noteworthy that property assessment should be an integral part of a well-
administered property tax system. Unfortunately, municipal valuers do not work 
independently of others. They are team players whose performance depends on other 
players responsible for accurate property records and those responsible for tax collection 
and enforcement. Thus, it is imperative to build capacity in areas of professional, 
technical and management skills, training, computerization and collection and 
enforcement procedure in order to have an efficient property tax system. 
3.4 Informal Rental Income 
According to the Income Tax Act CAP 323 of the Republic of Zambia, rental income 
simply relates to the income derived from the letting of real estate property.  The term 
‘rent’ is not defined in the Income Tax Act. However, it can be construed as any form of 
payment made for the use or occupation of real estate property (Feldstein: 1977). The 
Income Tax Act recognizes that income arises in various ways and as such, the 
classification of income in section 17 of the Income Tax Act is meant to enumerate the 
different types of income and income sources for assessing purposes.  
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According to Franzsen (2002), property tax is an annual tax levied on the ownership 
(occupation) of immovable property, which includes land, buildings or houses. Property 
tax therefore, has been an important source of local government revenue. However, 
before dealing with property taxes, or rates as it is often known in most of these 
countries, in its narrow sense, it should be noted that in most of the sub-Saharan 
countries, the income from the use, acquisition and or alienation of immovable property 
is generally taxed by means of other property-related taxes. It is noteworthy that different 
countries utilize a variety of tax bases to determine the annual property tax: land value, 
value of improvements on the land or both (Nsamba-Gayiiya: 2001).  
It is evident that Zambia can learn from how other countries have endeavoured to raise 
government revenues from the informal real estate sector. However, it has been observed 
that most Sub-Saharan countries (e.g. Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Namibia) have made attempts to capture the informal real estate housing sector indirectly 
through property tax (Franzsen: 2002) which does not precisely or necessarily capture tax 
from the income earned by landlords. It should be noted that property tax in Zambia is 
purely based on land (site value) as opposed to improvements made on the land (Chirwa: 
2000).  
Franzsen (2002) also states that even if property-related taxes are levied on all urban 
properties in sub-Saharan Africa, there are only a few countries (Namibia and South 
Africa for instance) which already have tax legislation on land value and property 
improvement value, and the rest (including Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya) are still 
struggling to formulate property tax legislation.  
In other words, it is clear that all efforts are directed towards taxing property as well as 
legislating for property taxes. However, with property tax being difficult to assess and 
value, it is imperative that housing rental income serve as a source of revenue to the 
treasury through withholding or presumptive tax levies. The difficulty in assessing and 
valuing property is exacerbated by the problem of the shortage of qualified and skilled 
manpower to survey land, keep good records and maintain an accurate deeds register 
(proper cadastral information) (Franzsen: 2002). And where property evaluators  are 
available, they lack the capacity to assess property and prepare proper valuation rolls. In 
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addition, they fail to undertake interim valuations and regular general revaluations, all of 
which are a prerequisite for a legitimate and efficient property tax system (Chirwa: 2000). 
This scenario and challenge apply to most countries in Southern Africa, including 
Zambia.   
It is clear that the lack of skilled manpower to properly assess and value property  results 
in low tax receipts, which in turn is gravely compounded by poor administration 
(Dillinger: 1996). It should be recognized that there are also political liabilities inherent 
in property tax that cripple the implementation of property tax laws and impair the 
collection of property tax. This is because politicians at district level fear tax revolts so 
much that they would rather see property tax go uncollected. However, in a situation like 
Zambia where poverty levels and unemployment levels are high, government has a 
challenge to collect more tax revenue and use it for developmental projects and in turn 
reverse the trend. As a result, it is prudent to capture tax revenue on rental income 
directly to enhance tax revenue collection and in turn finance most of the developmental 
projects internally.   
3.5 Institutional Framework for Property Tax Administration 
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the existence of well-defined tax laws alone cannot 
guarantee the success of the tax collection effort. There must be a supplementation of  tax 
incentives with wider reforms in the internal organization of revenue collecting 
authorities, such as reforms in information systems, organizational structure, budgeting 
and accounting systems, task assignments and other staffing policies (Mookherjee: 1997). 
An efficient and effective tax administration must also exist to implement such laws. An 
efficient and effective tax administration is therefore essential to successful domestic 
resource mobilization. This is in line with Surrey’s observation (cited in Mookherjee, 
1997:36):  
It is increasingly apparent that tax administration must receive far greater attention if 
the goals of tax policy are to be attained. Much of tax policy is being directed to 
obtaining increased revenues to enable governments to carry out their economic 
planning. The search is for additional taxes, for new sources of revenue. Yet it is true 
in many countries that the successful administration of some of the existing taxes 
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would provide a considerable part of the needed additional revenue. The diligent 
execution of existing taxes may well make unnecessary, or at least reduce, the 
multiplication of taxes in search of revenue. 
As defined by the Inter-American Centre for Tax Administrators, the term “efficiency” 
means the level of performance of a tax administration’s activities in terms of costs and 
productivity, while the term “effectiveness” signifies the level of taxpayer compliance 
with the revenue administration’s objectives (Serra: 2005; Manasan: 2003).  The 
advantages that derive from effective and efficient revenue administration are threefold 
(Serra: 2005;  Manasan: 2003): firstly effective administration is crucial to generating 
more tax revenue, enabling governments to achieve greater financial acumen and 
facilitating growth oriented programmes and the creation of the desired infrastructure for 
economic expansion. Secondly, this obviates the need to introduce higher tax rates and/or 
new taxes, a development that reduces the burden on existing taxpayers. Finally, efficient 
tax administration eases the adoption of simple and admissible tax laws, thereby 
undermining non-compliance.  
It should be noted that to achieve effective and efficient revenue administration, there is 
need to control fiscal corruption. According to Chand and Moene (1999), fiscal 
corruption can be controlled through reforming the design of taxes and their 
administration and the control of expenditure, waste and fraud. However, it is difficult to 
obtain adequate information on perceived fiscal corruption because, more often than not, 
parties involved naturally strive for concealment.   
It should be underscored that the extent of corruption in most revenue authorities can be 
obtained by comparing the theoretical yield of tax revenue and actual tax revenue 
collections (Chand & Moene: 1999). However, the shortfall in the tax revenue yield 
could be also attributed to other factors such as poor organization and administration of 
departments. The authors noted that it is also difficult to establish how much corruption 
adds to government expenditure, as standards for comparison are not readily available, 
particularly for government and quasi-government departments. In addition, they stated 
that corruption can be controlled by reducing the discretionary powers of tax 
administration officers, lowering tax rates to foster compliance, and having a standard or 
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good tax audit trail. Furthermore, Blackburn, Forgues-Puccio and Gonzalo (2005) state 
that corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the 
rich in providing false information to the government. 
An equally important advantage to be derived by governments from the existence of an 
efficient tax administration is that it enhances their ability to effectively enforce taxes 
with potentially high revenue yields such as income tax and its complex variations like 
excess profits tax or expenditure tax which demand precision and sophistication in their 
application (Serra: 2005; Mookherjee: 1997; Braithwaite & Braithwaite: 2000).  
An efficient tax administration can further devise means to tax the informal and the 
agricultural sectors of the economies of such countries that remain largely untaxed in 
spite of their inherent potential to provide a substantial portion of the revenues needed by 
such governments to carry out the social overhead projects necessary for economic 
development (Manasan: 2003).  
One easily noticeable feature of developing countries is their low tax effort. While the 
overall average tax effort level of these countries is estimated at about 18 percent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the average for industrialized countries is around 38 
percent (Tanzi & Zee: 2001). The disparity in the tax effort levels of these two groups of 
countries is therefore significant. The low tax effort levels of developing countries simply 
mean that the ability of such countries to collect tax revenue through voluntary 
compliance by taxpayers is severely restricted. There is therefore the need to increase the 
tax effort levels of the developing countries.  
The low tax efforts of these countries, which to some degree are a reflection of the weak 
tax administrations, have produced certain undesirable results in these countries 
(Caulfield: 2006; Fjeldstad: 2003; Graetz, Reinganum, & Wilde: 1986). Among such 
undesirable consequences are that the governments of such countries are usually forced to 
adopt taxes which are easy to administer, even if their revenue yields are low. This results 
in failure to institute sophisticated taxes whose implementation requires high levels of 
sophistication in tax administration. The choice of such easy-to-administer taxes not only 
leads to distortions in the country’s tax structure but also affects its ability to provide the 
necessary incentives for economic growth.  
  
41 
 
A weak tax administration also limits governments in their choice of tax options, making 
it difficult for them to undertake a comprehensive review of their tax laws in order to 
make them simpler, clearer, more equitable and neutral. The important thing, however, is 
that the difference between the taxable capacity of a country and the tax effort levels can 
and should be reduced by improved tax administration (Fjeldstad & Rakner: 2003).  
The institutional framework within which the revenue administration operates impacts 
directly on the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall tax management. However, 
Devas, Delay and Hubbard (2001) in their study on effectiveness and efficiency in 
Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and South Africa argue that both tax administration reforms 
and tax policy reforms must be implemented concurrently in order to have an effective 
and efficient fiscal management system which is prudent, transparent and accountable. 
This implies that tax administration reforms are not the only vehicle that can solve all 
problems, there is need to espouse wider reforms that touch on all institutions, policies 
and tax laws that affect efficiency and effectiveness in tax collection.  
With tax administration being one of the key components of reform, it is imperative that 
the institutional framework is chosen appropriately. The institutional frameworks in 
operation in developing countries are many and varied. The general trend, however, is to 
have separate administrations for internal taxes and customs duties as is the case in such 
countries as Barbados, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe (Fjeldstad & Rakner: 
2003). In some other countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, the Netherlands Antilles and 
Suriname, there are joint administrations of these taxes. Another common feature is that 
most of these administrations are part of the Civil Service machinery of the countries 
(Taliercio: 2004). Yet another feature is the location of the assessment and collection 
functions within the tax administration. The exceptions are Chile, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador and Peru, where the collection function is performed by a unit separate from the 
tax administration (Devas et al: 2001).   
When it comes to the provision of support services for the tax administration, the 
institutional arrangements with regard to tax administration are by no means uniform. 
While in Ghana, India, Chile and Colombia legal services are incorporated within the tax 
administration itself, in some other countries they are provided by the Ministry of Justice 
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(Taliercio: 2004). In some countries, personnel development and training are the 
responsibility of units within the tax administration. In others, however, they are 
performed by units outside the tax administration (Devas et al: 2001). Similarly, in many 
countries responsibility for the provision of other support services such as taxpayer 
services, internal audit functions, tax processing, data processing and management units 
for controlling, evaluating and coordinating plans and programmes is located in units and 
departments outside the tax administrations (Mookherjee: 1997).  
Even though, as indicated, the institutional frameworks of revenue administrations in 
developing countries differ from country to country, they appear to have some common 
problems, which need to be addressed (Fjeldstad & Rakner: 2003). The first of these is 
again described by Surrey (1958:96) as follows: 
Many countries really possess no such clear picture of their tax systems. Instead, 
there often exists a bewildering array of overlapping and contradictory taxes. Many 
of these taxes overlap so that a single commodity or transaction may be subject to a 
number of taxes, imposed at different or supplementary rates involving different tax 
bases with different times of payment, different returns and separate administrative 
and judicial procedures. Some of these taxes are obsolete yielding only small 
revenue or sometimes nothing at all, but remain on the books to complicate the tax 
structure.  
Other tax administrations are so riddled with exemptions as to be scarcely applicable to 
anyone (Tanzi & Zee: 2001). Moreover many tax measures are simply charges and fees 
for government concessions or services. Often the administrative provisions and judicial 
procedures of an existing tax are applied without change to new taxes because they are 
enacted without any examination of the differing requirements that the new taxes may 
warrant. In addition, the same words will be used in various tax laws but with different 
definitions or without definitions at all, so that only confusion in application can result. 
Further, the controlling laws themselves may be extremely difficult to locate. Very often 
there is a tangled mass of laws, regulations, decrees and the like reaching far into the 
past, jumbled together with amendments and modifications. When the statutory picture is 
so confused, it is extremely difficult for the government to know what it must administer 
and the taxpayers do not know what laws they must comply with (Aprill: 2001).  
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One solution to the problem presented by this “tangled mass of laws” is to have the 
various laws codified. This can be based on an orderly statutory rearrangement of the 
entire tax system in accordance with a definite outline (Central Statistical Office: 2003; 
Aprill: 2001). The various taxes should be classified as income taxes, succession taxes, 
property taxes, excise and sales taxes, and so on. Each in turn should be sub-divided so 
that each tax is separately identified. Overlapping between the taxes should be 
eliminated, with the various taxes applicable to a single article or transaction consolidated 
into one tax. Moreover, the substantive provisions describing the articles or persons taxed 
and fixing the rate and base of the tax should be separated from the administrative 
provisions. The latter should be divided functionally, as respects the returns to be filed, 
the time for payment, the other duties of the taxpayer, the powers of the administrator, the 
penalties imposed, among others (Thuronyi: 1996; Steuerle: 2004). 
Tax laws by their very nature are subject to frequent changes. Every year the annual 
budget statement introduces new measures and procedures, amends, or cancels existing 
ones. These frequent changes can make the law confusing as well as complicate the tax 
structure (Manasan: 2003). After a few years, these changes and amendments become so 
many that the taxpayer finds it difficult to know which laws are applicable. As Talierco 
(2004) suggests there is a need therefore for the tax administration to undertake periodic 
consolidation of the tax laws so that it can have all the amendments and changes 
compiled into one statute to which both taxpayers and tax administration can have easy 
and ready access. Another institutional arrangement that seems to impede the efficiency 
and effectiveness of tax administrations in some of these countries is the linkage of the 
revenue administration with the Civil Service (Taliercio:2004). The revenue 
administration, therefore, reflects the weaknesses and structural defects existing within 
the Civil Service organization, especially excessive bureaucracy, low morale and the 
inadequacy of resources.  
In the light of these problems, many developing countries have now embarked on a 
restructuring programme of their revenue administrations (Fjeldstad & Rakner: 2003). 
This exercise has resulted in the adoption of an institutional framework within which the 
revenue administrations have been made semi-autonomous and excised from the Civil 
Service, thus freeing them from the problems that plague the Civil Service. One of the 
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pioneers in this restructuring exercise in Africa, whose results have been adopted in other 
countries in Africa, albeit with slight modifications, is Ghana (Addison et al: 2001).  
3.6 Conclusion 
It can be said that tax revenue can only be enhanced if tax administration is efficient and 
effective and serious efforts are made to broaden the tax base through policy strategies 
such as capturing the informal real estate (housing) sector among others. In light of 
Zambia’s need to broaden its tax base and of recently scholarly debates on related topics, 
this chapter has sought to highlight the current thinking which indicates how to 
accomplish this goal. Drawing lessons from some developing countries such as Ghana, 
South Africa and Kenya, Zambia needs to introduce or strengthen such taxes as the base, 
withholding and presumptive taxes. Introducing or consolidating these taxes would be 
meaningless unless tax administration in Zambia is made efficient through legal reforms.  
This chapter demonstrates that there are different strategies that countries are using to 
capture the informal sector into the national tax net. These strategies form the basis upon 
which this study has drawn to explore ways in which Zambia can broaden its tax net, by 
bringing the informal real estate housing sector into the national economy. The chapter 
also illuminates the fact that the informal real estate housing sector has the potential to 
contribute to the tax revenue of any nation. However, it is clear from the literature 
reviewed in this chapter that bringing the informal sector into the tax net is complex and 
needs well thought through policies and strategies. For example, the chapter provides 
evidence that there is substantial income that can be generated from the informal real 
estate housing sector. But because of the fears of tax revolts if this tax was collected 
directly, district councils opt to engage an indirect way of collecting it through property 
taxes. It is evident that substantial revenue could be raised through taxing the informal 
real estate housing sector by targeting the high-density, medium-density and low-density 
residential categories.  The next chapter discusses the methodology used in this study.  
The chapter provides a situational analysis of each residential category discussed above 
and how much tax revenue could be collected from each category in the Lusaka Urban 
District in comparison with the actual revenue collected by the Zambia Revenue 
Authority, to determine the potential tax revenue gap.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methodology that was used to estimate tax revenue 
that can be collected from the informal house rental market in the Lusaka Urban District 
of Zambia. Kerlinger (1970) defines research as the systematic, controlled, empirical and 
critical investigation of hypothetical propositions about the presumed relationships 
among natural phenomena. Lusaka was purposively picked from a number of major cities 
and towns with developed rental markets. During the research process, it became evident 
that Lusaka Urban District has statistics of rented accommodation or rather houses where 
tenants pay rent (Central Statistics Office: 2006). These statistics have been used in a 
mathematical model to estimate the potential tax revenue that can be collected from the 
informal real estate housing sector in the Lusaka Urban District. The research also 
demonstrates that a similar approach can be used to estimate the potential tax revenue 
that can be collected from the informal real estate housing sector in the whole country.   
This section of the study also explains the research methods, data sources, data collection 
techniques, data organization, and data analysis. It also explains how other taxes on the 
informal sector business can be computed and estimated, with the focus on the recently 
introduced advance income tax enforced on imports by unregistered taxpayers or 
importers. These estimates of potential revenue from turnover taxes are compared with 
actual revenue collected.  These estimates are then consolidated to show the extent of 
revenue that can be collected from informal sector business in Zambia.  
4.2 Data Sources 
4.2.1 Central Statistical Office and Zambia Revenue Authority 
Data needed to estimate the potential tax from the real estate housing informal sector are 
available at the Central Statistical Office (CSO) and the Zambia Revenue Authority. Data 
was collected from the CSO housing census survey of 2004 and 2005 for Lusaka, to 
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determine the number of housing units, which include data on whether a housing unit is 
rented out or not. The data also contains basic housing attributes such as number of 
rooms, location, whether electrified or not and whether it is connected to regular 
municipal water supply or not. These attributes and other neighborhood attributes 
influence rental prices. It is, however, not the objective of this study to establish what 
attributes influence rental prices, although it is an interesting area for future research. Tax 
information was collected from the Zambia Revenue Authority database, including tax 
rates and actual tax revenue.  
4.3 Data analysis 
 4.3.1 Analysing Data from the CSO for Potential Tax Revenue from the 
Informal Housing Sector 
The approach used to estimate the total withholding tax on informal housing rental 
income was developed as follows: first it was assumed that a standard housing unit with a 
set of physical and neighborhood attributes (j), attracts a rental price rij. It is also 
assumed that there are k landlords in the study area (City of Lusaka) with hij residential 
housing units of different attributes on rent (k and i denote the kth and ith landlord and 
housing units respectively). Further, it was assumed that landlords are not registered for 
withholding tax and hence do not pay any tax on rental income, but that it is the tenant’s 
responsibility to withhold the tax component on his rent and remit it to the Zambia 
Revenue Authority. The research interest was not to compute the tax payable to the 
Zambia Revenue Authority from rental income appropriated by the landlord, but the tax 
that was collectable on rent that the tenant should have withheld and remitted to the 
Zambia Revenue Authority.   
The annual rental income per housing unit is denoted with ij and attributes by yij. Then 
the landlord’s gross rental income per annum is calculated by multiplying rental price by 
the number of housing units owned. This if formally stated as:  
)(
11 ijij
n
iij
n
i
hry ×Σ=Σ
=−
   (1) 
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Total rental income is multiplied by the withholding tax rate of t* to obtain the total tax 
revenue from the informal housing real estate sector in Lusaka urban area. This can be 
stated as: 
ij
n
i
ytTax
1
*
−
Σ=
    (2) 
Equation (2) shows the total potential tax revenue that government can collect from the 
informal housing rental market, assuming costless enforcement and full compliance.  In 
other words, it gives the potential tax revenue that can be collected, assuming 100 percent 
enforcement, and this is then compared to the actual revenue that the tax authority 
collected in 2005.  
4.3.2 Analysing Data from ZRA for Potential Revenue from the Informal 
Sector 
This section presents an approach used to measure the potential income and the tax that 
can be collected from those involved in cross-border trading who are not registered for 
taxes and those who have not been compliant with income tax in the previous year, that 
is, for 2006 and 2007. An analysis was made of the recently introduced advance income 
tax collected at the border on imports by unregistered and non-compliant traders. These 
traders pay 3 percent advance income tax on the total landed value of their imports, but 
can claim the full amount of advance income tax paid on their imports when they file 
their income tax returns with the domestic taxes division. Those not registered cannot 
claim the advance income tax, in which case this tax becomes a final tax to government. 
Since the advance income tax is levied on imports of unregistered traders, data on 
imports into the country is used for this group of importers for the period of one year to 
compute the amount of turnover tax expected (potential) to be collected inland if all 
unregistered importers where to truthfully declare their local sales and pay 3 percent 
turnover tax on sales. This value represents the minimum turnover tax that would have 
been collected if the advance tax was collected at the border; the value is expected to be 
larger if unregistered traders paid tax on turnover tax locally since 3 percent on the total 
cost of goods is less than 3 percent on total sales. It is also important to note that this 
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estimate only applies to cross-border trading by unregistered traders. Those who are 
registered are captured either in company tax or turnover taxes.  
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
 APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTIVE TAXATION TECHNIQUES 
TO THE INFORMAL REAL ESTATE HOUSING SECTOR IN ZAMBIA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 discussed the research process and methodology. It also introduced a 
mathematical model upon which the computation of the potential tax income from real 
estate was based.  Drawing on the mathematical model and statistical data from the 
Central Statistical Office, this chapter discusses the potential income that the Zambia 
Revenue Authority could capture by taxing real estate housing sector. The chapter also 
discusses some of the taxes that have been introduced to capture income from the 
informal sector.  
5.2 Tax Collection from Informal Sector Businesses 
There are a number of strategies that the government has put in place to bring income 
from the informal sector into the Treasury through the tax system. The performance of 
different taxes that have been introduced to capture the informal sector into the tax net is 
set out below and in the last section a summary of the overall performance of these taxes 
between 2004 and 2007 is provided.  
5.3 Presumptive tax on Taxi and Minibus Operators 
The presumptive tax regime was introduced to capture public transport operators 
(minibuses and taxis) who are not registered under company tax. Transport operators in 
this category pay a daily fee or tax based on minibus seating capacity as shown in Table 
5.1 below. The Zambia Revenue Authority has increased collections from this tax from 
this section of the economy from K1.0 billion in 2004 to K1.85 billion in 2006 and 2007 
respectively.  
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Table 4 - Tax Paid By Minibus Operators per annum  
Type Of Vehicle Amount Of Tax Per Vehicle Per Year* 
64 seater and above K7,200,000 
50-63 seater K6,000,000 
36-49 seater K4,800,000 
22-35 seater K3,600,000 
18-21 seater K2,400,000 
12-17 seater K1,200,000 
below 12 seater (include taxis) K600,000 
Note: * The amounts payable are broken down into daily tickets to make the amounts 
more affordable. 
5.4 Advance Income Tax 
Advance Income Tax is a tax withheld in respect of imported goods for commercial 
purposes. This means that goods imported for personal use are excluded from this tax 
(Zambia Revenue Authority, 2007).  
The purpose of introducing the Advance Income Tax in 2007 was to broaden the tax base 
by targeting more profitable sections of the informal and unregistered enterprises which 
are engaged in cross-border trading. Advance Income Tax is computed at the point of 
entry at the rate of 3 percent on the value of imports for unregistered importers and non-
compliant taxpayers. Advance Income Tax is not a final tax. The initial objectives of this 
tax were to encourage non-registered businesses to register for taxes and also to make 
enforcement of compliance on traders more cost effective.   
The impact of the introduction of advance tax both on registration of businesses in the 
informal sector and enforcing compliance on small scale enterprises and self employed 
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individuals has been impressive. Upon its introduction in April 2007, the Zambia 
Revenue Authority collected about K13 billion from unregistered importers in 2007.  
This tax has helped to increase tax collection from more profitable informal sector 
activities and is expected to improve compliance on turnover tax and help to capture the 
informal sector into the tax net. With increased compliance strategies implemented in 
2008, monthly tax collection on advance income tax has increased from K526 million in 
January 2007 to K4.2 billion in April 2007, raising K8.1 billion from this tax type alone 
between January and April 2008 (Bwalya & Sigande: 2007).  
5.5 Turnover Tax 
Turnover tax is a tax on gross sales/turnover, that is, earnings, income, revenue, takings, 
yield and proceeds (Zambia Revenue Authority: 2003). Turnover tax is collected from 
businesses whose turnover is less than K200 million and hence not eligible to register for 
company tax. This tax is directed at any person whose business earnings are subject to 
Withholding Tax and such Withholding Tax is not the final tax. This includes businesses 
and individuals earning rental income, commissions, interest and royalties. This tax has 
been quite productive, increasing its contribution to revenue from K4.3 billion in 2004 to 
K18.7 billion in 2007 (Bwalya & Sigande: 2007) It is expected that the productivity of 
this tax will continue to grow as new and more cost-effective compliance strategies are 
implemented.  
5.6 Base Tax 
The base tax is a tax mainly collected from market places. The tax is collected in 
partnership with the local authorities and is a major source of revenue in most rural and 
provincial centres. Base tax is currently applied in those towns where it is easy and 
practical to collect. It is not administered in major towns. Base tax is levied on small-
businesses that cannot maintain adequate records on which to base a correct tax 
assessment at the end of the charge year.  In 2007 the base tax rate was increased to 
K150, 000 from K50, 000 per charge year. The mechanisms for collecting this tax are 
more challenging and expensive, but new strategies are being worked out to engage with 
local councils to help in the administration of this tax. Collections from base tax are 
recorded under turnover tax. 
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Table 5 - Trend in revenue collections from informal sector (K' billion) 
Tax Type 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Presumptive Tax 1.0 1.05 1.85 1.82 
Turnover tax 4.3 9.8 13 18.7 
Advance Income Tax - - - 13.0 
Total  5.3 10.85 14.85 33.52 
*Advance tax was introduced in April 2007. 
(Source: Zambia Revenue Annual Report, 2007) 
Table 5 above summarizes the performance of taxes that target informal or small 
businesses and self-employed individuals. All tax types have more than doubled their 
contribution between 2004 and 2007, while the Advance Income Tax, which was only 
introduced in 2007, has made a significant contribution to revenue from the informal 
sector.  The total collections from these taxes increased from K5.3 billion in 2004 to 
K33.54 billion in 2007 (Bwalya & Sigande: 2007; Phiri: 2007). This is a substantial 
contribution to the Treasury by this sector. 
5.7 Estimating Potential Revenue from an Advance Tax on Importations 
This section of the present study analyzes the impact of introducing an advance tax on 
importations by unregistered traders as a means to promote tax registration, and indirectly 
assesses how this measure can be used to improve compliance under the turnover tax. In 
other words, how much revenue would be collected from advance tax and how the 
established database of traders can be used, is examined to estimate the possibility to 
enforce compliance and improve revenue collection from small businesses operating 
informally (unregistered for taxes).  
The major objective for introducing an Advance Tax was initially to encourage individual 
businesses to register for taxes as those not registered would suffer an advance tax of 3 
percent at time of importation. This tax is not a final tax; it can be claimed back when the 
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taxpayer files an income tax return with the Domestic Taxes Division. While increasing 
tax registration was the rationale used to have this measure passed, the measure had the 
potential to raise revenue in 2007 estimated at K20 billion, and is important to the 
Zambia Revenue Authority because it can be used to promote compliance among 
importers registered under the turnover tax. This is possible because the Zambia Revenue 
Authority now has a database on the Automated System of Customs Data (Asycuda) 
against which to estimate the minimum tax payable by those involved in cross border 
trade. 
5.8 Advance Tax and Tax Administration 
By the end of 2007, the Zambia Revenue Authority collected about K13 billion in 
advance tax revenue, which is assumed to be net as advance tax claims are negligible, if 
not zero. It is difficult to ascertain the impact of advance tax on income tax registration 
recorded in 2007. The trends in tax registration indicate that the total number of taxpayers 
registered for income tax increased from 44,490 in 2006 to about 54,419 in December 
2007 (Zambia Revenue Authority: 2007). But this increase is not remarkably different 
from that recorded between 2005 and 2006, when registrations increased by 13,757 
(Zambia Revenue Authority, 2007). It is therefore difficult to attribute the increase in 
income tax registrations solely to the introduction of advance tax; at most the impact is 
likely to be marginal (Bwalya & Sigande: 2007). 
5.9 Non-Compliant Taxpayers 
The present study has extracted from the Integrated Tax Administration System (ITAS), 
the number of firms that did not file their income returns in the charge year ending 
September 2007. This is after taking into account multiple account numbers on the 
system to remove duplications. The data indicates that there are about 51,190 taxpayers 
registered for income tax. Of these, 18 percent (9,164) filed their income returns in 2006 
and 2007 and 82 percent did not. Of these only 24 are registered as government 
departments and 330 as non-governmental organizations. What is important is to examine 
how many of these made importations in 2007 because, for these, a more effective 
compliance strategy can be configured in the Automated System Customs Data 
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(Asycuda) to ensure that in future they pay advance tax on their importations, and 
possibly recover any advance outstanding  tax obligations from the past (Phiri: 2007). 
Of the total number of taxpayers who did not file income tax returns (41,696), only 5 
percent made importations in 2007, amounting K16, 718 billion in terms of value for duty 
purposes. Importations by non-compliant taxpayers account for 99.9 percent of this value 
and the rest (0.1percent) is accounted for by importations by the government, agencies 
and non-governmental organisations. Since these traders were registered by taxpayer 
identification number and for income tax, the advance tax of 3 percent was not charged 
on their importations in 2007, with the hope that they would declare their income tax 
when they do their turnover tax returns. The present study therefore attempts to calculate 
the minimum tax that would have been collected if these firms had paid a 3 percent 
advance tax at the time of making an importation.  
5.10 Potential Revenue from Advance Income Tax 
The Advance Tax has been calculated that would have been collected from these non-
compliant firms if they had been made to pay tax at the border.  This value represents the 
minimum turnover tax that would have been collected if the advance tax was collected at 
the border; the value is expected to be larger if taxpayers paid tax on turnover.  The total 
value of importations obtained from the Asycuda database for those taxpayers who did 
not file an income tax return in the charge year ending September 2007 was multiplied by 
the advance tax of 3 percent as legislated in 2007. The value of the duty for the purpose 
of importations by non- compliant taxpayers is estimated at K 16,717 billion. Applying a 
3 percent advance tax on this figure would have raised K501.5 billion in advance tax 
revenue in 2007 (Bwalya & Sigande: 2007). 
The key policy question is how to ensure that this amount is collected from non-
compliant traders at the lowest cost to the Authority. The compliance and revenue 
recovery strategy as set out below, was proposed.  Since it is known that at best K501.5 
billion in advance tax would have been collected on importers who fail to comply with 
tax payments, it is recommended that Domestic Taxes enforce compliance on these firms 
through customs clearance by reconfiguring the database on Asycuda.  Removing non-
compliant taxpayers from the Asycuda database has the effect that when these non-
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compliant businesses in future make importations, advance tax can automatically be 
levied and collected right at the port of entry. This measure will not recover the estimated 
revenue but will raise significant revenue at almost zero enforcement cost to the 
Authority. Once the non-compliant importers have paid 3 percent advance tax on their 
current importations, they should further be required or at least advised to settle any 
advance unpaid tax on their imports in earlier years.  
For those taxpayers who did not import anything but who are non-compliant because they 
did not file their income tax returns in the charge year 2006 and 2007, these should also 
be removed from the Asycuda database so that should they decide to import in future, 
advance income tax can be charged and collected on all their imports until when they are 
cleared by Domestic Taxes as compliant.  
In addition to these measures, Domestic Taxes should use this information to enforce 
compliance on these taxpayers inland. 
5.11 Potential Revenue from the Informal Real Estate Sector in Lusaka 
The principle objective of this study was to estimate the amount of tax revenue that can 
be collected from the rental from the real estate informal housing sector in Zambia, using 
the town of Lusaka as a case study. This town, which is also the capital city of Zambia, 
was chosen because more accurate data is available and it also has the largest informal 
rental housing sector in the country.  
Table 6 below shows estimates of potential income generated in the informal rental 
housing sector in Lusaka and the corresponding tax revenue that can be collected when 
full compliance is assumed. In the first column, three residential categories are reported. 
These are high density (low income), medium density (middle income) and low density 
(high income) residential categories. Column two shows the number of households in 
each residential category that live in rented accommodation. Column three shows the 
average rental price per housing unit and columns four and five show monthly rental 
income that accrues to landlords and the estimate of total monthly tax revenue per 
residential area respectively. The last column shows the total potential annual tax revenue 
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that would be collected if compliance was fully enforced. The withholding tax on rental 
income is set at 15 percent.  
Table 6-  Estimated Annual income and potential tax revenue for Lusaka urban 
district (K millions) 
Residenti
al Areas  
 
 
Number 
Household
s in Rented 
houses   
( )ijh  
(a)  
Rental Price 
Per month 
(K’000’)  
 
( )ijr  
(b) 
Estimated rental 
Monthly 
Income  
 
 
( )ijy = ( )ba *  
 
Tax revenue 
per month 
 
 
( )ijij yrtax *=  
 
Potential 
Annual 
Tax 
Revenue 
Estimate 
∗t ( )ijy12  
 
 
High 
density  
177, 209  150.5 26,669.9 800     9,601 
Medium-
density  
23, 052  450.5 10.385.0 0.311        3.74 
Low-
density  
24, 243  2, 500 60.608 9.091      109. 1 
Total 224,504 Na 26,740.95 809.40    9,713.8 
Source: CSO (2000).   
Note: Income from medium and high density housing units is taxed at a 3 percent 
turnover tax rate and low density housing units at a withholding tax rate of 15 percent.  
Of the total housing units, about 78.9 percent of the housing units surveyed are located in 
high density residential areas and only 10.2 percent and 10.9 percent are in medium 
density and low density residential areas. As expected, there are significant differences in 
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rental rates, with housing units in the low density areas costing K2.5 million per month 
while those in medium and high density residential areas priced at K450, 500 and     
K150, 500 respectively.  When the rental rate is multiplied by the number of rented 
housing units in each category, it is found that on aggregate, the largest rental income is 
appropriated by landlords with housing units in high density areas, followed by those 
with housing units in medium and high residential areas.  
The total monthly rental income from high density housing units is estimated at K27 
billion, K10.4 billion for medium density housing units, and K60.6 billion for low density 
housing units in Lusaka Urban. This means that the total annual rental income for all 
residential categories is K809.4 billion.  The current tax regime imposes a 15 percent 
withholding tax for rental income above K200 million per annual, and a turnover tax of 3 
percent on income below this threshold. These rates are applied to compute the potential 
tax revenue in each of the residential categories, with the medium and high density 
housing units being taxed at 3 percent and the low density housing units at 15percent. 
The estimated annual tax yield is specified in the last column of Table 6.  The total 
potential tax revenue collectable is estimated at K9, 713 billion per annum for the Lusaka 
Urban Sector only. These estimates indicate that the greatest potential to capture revenue 
lies in the high density residential areas through turnover tax. Enforcing compliance in 
this market segment is costly and problematic, although not necessarily insurmountable. 
The challenge lies in formalizing property rights (title deeds) to landlords of these 
housing units. At present most of these units have no formal title deeds and are therefore 
difficult to capture in the tax net. 
5.12 Potential National Real Estate Tax Income 
In this section, the study extrapolates the Lusaka potential real estate tax income to the 
national level. There are 1,768,287 housing units in Zambia (Central Statistical Office: 
2000). Of these, 1,170,781 (66.2 percent) are in rural areas and 597,506 (33.8 percent) in 
urban areas. 93 percent of housing units in rural areas are owner occupied and only 7 
percent are rented. In the case of urban areas 46.6 percent of the housing units are rented. 
The information in column 1 of Table 7 was used to estimate the distribution of housing 
units, which indicates that 78.9 percent, 10.2 percent and 10.9 percent of housing units 
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are in high, medium and low residential categories respectively. Rental rates vary by 
location and across towns, and specific information on average rental rates for the 
purpose of making accurate estimates is not available, except for Lusaka Urban. 
Therefore average rental prices for all towns in the country are estimated at 50 percent of 
rental prices in the Lusaka Urban District. This is close to the average rental price at 
national level.  
Table 7: Potential rental revenue from all rented housing units in Zambia (K millions) 
 housing 
categories 
No. of 
housing 
units 
rented 
units 
total rental 
income/m 
rental 
income 
per yr 
tax 
revenue 
per yr 
High density        
923,746  
       
64,662  
        
4,865.8  
        
58,389.9  
        
1,751.7 
Medium density        
119,420  
         
8,359  
        
1,883.0  
        
22,595.4  
          
677.9 
Low density        
127,615  
         
8,933  
      
11,166.3  
      
133,995.9  
        
4,019.9 
 
 
 
All rural 
rental 
housing 
units Subtotal (rural)     
1,170,781  
       
81,955  
17,915.1       
214,981.3  
       
6,449.4  
High density        
471,432  
      
219,687  
      
16,531.5  
      
198,377.7  
        
5,951.33 
Medium density          
60,946  
       
28,401  
        
6,397.2  
        
76,766.2  
        
2,303.0 
Low density          
65,128  
       
30,350  
      
37,937.2  
      
455,245.8  
      
68,286.9 
 
 
All Urban 
rental 
housing 
units 
Subtotal (urban)              60,865.9            
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597,506  278,438  730,390.5  76,541.2  
Total All GRAND 
TOTAL 
     
1,768,287  
      
360,392  
      
78,780.9  
      
945,371.8  
      
82,990.6  
At 50 
percent tax 
compliance 
Total         
884,144  
      
180,196  
      
39,390.5  
      
472,685.9  
      
41,495.3  
 
Source: CSO: 2000 housing census report. Rental prices are K75, 000, K225, 000 and 
K1, 250,000 for high, medium and low residential housing units. 
Rental income for all rural households is below the rental withholding income threshold 
and hence taxed under turnover tax at 3 percent. This is also the case for rental income in 
urban areas for high density and medium density housing units, but low density housing 
units are taxed at the withholding tax rate of 15 percent since income is above K200 
million.  With this assumption, the estimated national rental income per annum is K945.4 
billion, of which 77 percent is from the urban rental housing sector and the remainder is 
from the rural sector (33 percent). Applying the appropriate tax rates yields a total 
potential revenue of K83 billion per annum, which is approximately 0.2 percent of 
projected Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2007. This would still make a significant 
contribution to the National Treasury even if this estimate had to scale down by 50 
percent to take into account the low tax compliance levels in this sector.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
REFLECTIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter marks the end of the thesis with a reflection on the objectives and 
methodology in the light of the findings and insights of the study. It also discusses the 
recommendations and reflects on the lessons learnt. 
6.2 Reflections  
The principle objective of this study was to analyze the tax revenue that can be mobilized 
from the rental housing sector and to estimate the potential revenue that can be raised by 
putting in place a more efficient regime. Using data from the housing survey conducted 
by the Central Statistics Office and data on actual tax collections from the real estate 
sector, the findings show that there is great potential to mobilize substantial tax revenue 
to help finance the country’s development program. The findings of the study 
demonstrate that the real estate sector, which in recent years has consistently posted high 
growth rates, can help to create substantial fiscal space by broadening the country’s tax 
revenue base. But this can only be realized by undertaking tax policy and legislative 
changes aimed at encouraging voluntary compliance and enhancing revenue collection 
from this sector. 
Critical to such reforms is the need to ensure that the compliance burden falls on the 
landlord and not the tenant as the case is now. This will ensure that tax liability on rental 
properties which has not been remitted to the Zambia Revenue Authority can be 
recovered from the physical asset generating that income stream on which the 
withholding tax is collected. The study found that at present the revenue laws place the 
compliance burden on the tenant to withhold and remit the 15 percent tax on rental 
income. In addition, the study findings reveal significant weaknesses in enforcement by 
the Zambia Revenue Authority and sustaining compliance and revenue productivity of 
the rental withholding tax on real estate.  
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In terms of estimates of potential revenue that can be collected, assuming costless 
enforcement or 100 percent self compliance, the study results show that rental income 
from high density housing units is estimated at K26.6 billion per annum and income from 
low and medium density housing units was estimated at K10.4 billion and K60.6 billion 
per annum respectively. The total potential tax revenue collectable was estimated at K9.7 
billion per annum for Lusaka Urban district. These results indicate that the greatest 
potential to capture revenue lies in the high density residential areas. The challenge, 
however, lies in formalizing property rights (title deeds) to landlords as at present most of 
the housing units in medium and high density residential areas have no formal title deeds.   
Further, the study finds that of the total 224,504 housing units surveyed in Lusaka urban, 
about 78.9 percent of the housing units are located in high density residential areas and 
only 10.2 percent and 10.9 percent are located in medium and low density residential 
areas. The analysis also reveals significant differences in rental rates, with rental rates on 
housing units in the low density areas on average K2.5 million per month while those in 
medium and high density residential areas are K450, 000 and K150, 000 respectively. 
This implies that those landlords with rental housing units in low density areas receive 
more income per month than those with housing units in medium and high residential 
areas, but it is not known whether this finding holds in net terms.  The total tax revenue is 
estimated at K9.7 billion per annum. This figure is high on account of the large number 
of units compared to those in low and medium residential areas, but the major problem of 
capturing this revenue is that these housing units lack formal title deeds and the housing 
rental market operates informally. To achieve the revenue collections, the tax authority, 
the local councils and the ministry of land will have to work together and share 
information on the real estate sector to help better manage compliance.   
In this context, the potential tax revenue that can be captured from informal housing 
rental market from the Lusaka Urban alone is quite significant and would represent 3 
percent of collections from withholding taxes in 2007, of which rental withholding tax is 
just one of the taxes. The total revenue collection from all withholding taxes was K326 
billion (Zambia Revenue Authority: 2007). The study estimates that at least K945.4 
billion is earned from the rental housing sector per annum. Tax collections from this 
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source of revenue would have been K83 billion in tax revenue or 0.2 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in 2007.  This is a significant contribution to National Treasury.  
5.3 Conclusion 
This study, in addition to capturing income from the real estate sector, demonstrates that 
there exists a great potential for expanding the tax net by innovatively applying and 
enforcing the presumptive tax regimes for informal sector businesses with an annual 
turnover below the threshold of K200 million. Study findings indicate that as much as 
K500 billion could be collected through the Advance Income Tax imposed on imports of 
unregistered importers and those not compliant with the turnover tax regime. Adding this 
estimate to the potential tax revenue from rental housing sector of K83 billion brings the 
total potential revenue to K583 billion. Over 90 percent of this revenue is currently not 
being collected.   
One key research limitation is worth noting. Firstly, the study drew on secondary data on 
the number of housing units in various residential categories obtained by the Central 
Statistical Office in the 2000 National Census of Population and Housing. This data, 
however, lacks detail on rental prices of housing units across locations and towns. Thus 
estimates and the conclusions drawn in this study should be interpreted with caution. 
These results, despite the shortcoming, provide important insights about the rental 
housing sector and the potential to capture and mobilize government revenue from this 
sector that has had in excess of 6 percent growth rates since 2002. This information 
should prove valuable to future research on real estate in Zambia and other countries and 
indeed to policymakers concerned with improving revenue collections from this sector. 
Further, the analysis of the performance of presumptive tax regimes and how advance 
income tax can be applied to improve compliance with presumptive regimes shows some 
of the innovative approaches that can be designed and implemented to foster tax 
compliance among small and medium scale enterprises, including those operating 
informally.    
5.4 Recommendations 
Based on the findings of this research and the discussions herein, the study recommends 
that legislation should be reviewed to require that the landlord withholds the tax on rental 
  
63 
 
properties and remits it to the Revenue Authority and that enforcement of compliance be 
strengthened and penalties increased sufficiently so that the deterrence can be used to 
promote voluntary compliance and thereby lower the costs of collection. In order to 
promote compliance and increase revenue collection, efforts towards formalizing these 
transactions and assigning property rights (title deeds) should be expedited in order to 
bring these activities into the formal economy and the tax net. If rental income was to be 
subjected to presumptive tax regime at a flat rate of 3 percent, which is applicable to all 
businesses with annual turnover less than K200 million, the total tax that can be collected 
from the housing rental sector in Lusaka Urban is estimated at K9.7 billion.  Households 
earning less than K200 million per annum from rental income should also be captured in 
the tax net. This will ensure that the application of the presumptive tax regime for the 
informal sector through turnover tax is equitable.  
Government should revise the tax laws and ensure that landlords withhold and remit tax 
to Zambia Revenue Authority because enforcing compliance on landlords would be 
easier as their housing units can be held as security for unremitted taxes.  Government 
should continue with the current tax threshold on rental income of K200 million but 
ensure that those whose rental income is below this threshold are taxed at the turnover tax 
rate of 3 percent. This will ensure equitable treatment of rental income with all other 
incomes in accordance with the Income Tax Act.  
Government should simplify the taxpayer registration formalities. This entails the 
integration of registration for all tax types. The Taxpayer Identification Number (TPIN) 
should be used as a universal interface to give government access to all the tax types 
which are applicable to a particular taxpayer. This is in view of the fact that taxpayers, 
who are not registered for some taxes for which under the tax laws they are liable, may be 
eligible for a tax refund in other wing of the Zambia Revenue Authority.   
Government should further streamline and enhance the institutional capability of the 
Zambia Revenue Authority to enforce the country’s revenue laws including its capacity 
to investigate and prosecute tax evaders. This is critical in building voluntary compliance 
and sustaining a buoyant tax system. In addition the Zambia Revenue Authority should 
explore and establish effective partnerships with other government agencies and the 
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private sector, where for instance, the local councils may be subcontracted to collect 
some presumptive taxes in certain towns where collection by the Zambia Revenue 
Authority is not cost effective. It is important also to develop robust databases and share 
these with other government agencies to improve decision-making and tax compliance 
management.  
The government and Zambia Revenue Authority should carry out educational campaigns 
programs to explain the importance of landlords paying tax on their rental income. In 
other words, in view of widespread apathy and political sensitivity towards the taxation 
of the informal estates housing sector, there is a need for government to own this 
campaign and provide the effective political will necessary to improve compliance and 
fair enforcement of tax laws. The government should adopt deliberate policies aimed at 
promoting formalization of the informal real estate housing sector and expedite the 
issuance of legal title to property. This will create the necessary database on housing 
units that can be used to enforce presumptive taxes and also help to better manage 
property taxes in the country.  
Tax collection could also be enhanced if landlords are captured in the tax net through 
extensive use of utility companies such as Zambia Electricity and Supply Corporation 
(ZESCO), Zambia Telecommunications Limited (ZAMTEL) and Water and Sewerage 
companies, to the extent that when landlords are paying for their electricity, telephone 
and water services, details on whether they own or rent the houses with physical 
addresses for such properties should be indicated, which data could then be used by the 
Zambia Revenue Authority to ensure enhanced compliance by landlords.  
Property assessment issues and tax issues should be kept apart. Valuations should not be 
manipulated or corrupted to attain equity. Equity is best attained through proper property 
categorization, adjustments to tax rates or the use of tax rebates. 
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